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Abstract—Software connected to the Internet is an attractive
target for attackers: as soon as a security flaw is known, services
may be taken under attack. In contrast, software developers
release updates to add further features and fix flaws in order
to increase its security. Consequently, a user of the software
wants to have the latest secure version running. However, if the
software is provided as a service, e.g., as part of the cloud, the
user relies on the service provider (SP) to perform such updates.
But when asking for the software version, the user has to trust
the output of SP or his software. Latter may be malformed, since
updating software costs time and money, i.e., in comparison to
changing a (false) version string.
The question rises how a client of a software service can
provably determine the real software version of the running
service at the SP, also known as Remote Software Identification
(RSI). While existing tools provide an answer, they can be tricked
by the service to output any forged string because they rely
on the information handed directly by the SP. We solve the
problem of RSI by introducing Reverse Fingerprinting (RFP),
a novel challenge-response scheme which employs the evaluation
of inherit functions of software versions depending on certain
inputs. That is, RFP does not rely on version number APIs but
employs a database consisting of function inputs and according
outputs and combines them with a strategy and a randomness
source to provably determine the version number. We also
provide a theoretical framework for RSI and RFP, and describe
how to create databases and strategies. Additionally, RFP can
be securely outsourced to a third party, called the auditor, to
take away the burden of the user while respecting liability. We
also provide an implementation and API to perform RFP in
practice, showing that most of the providers have installed the
latest versions.
Index Terms—Fingerprinting, Software Versioning, Remote
Software Identification, Cloud Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Computers are present in various forms in our everyday
life, for example desktop PCs, laptops, servers, smartphones,
watches, TVs, routers, surveillance cameras, or even cars. A
computer can be seen as a system that consists of storage,
computational power, and interfaces to send and receive mes-
sages. Due to smart homes, smart grids, and the Internet of
things, the amount of connected devices and computers will
rise even more in the years to come.
At the end, most computers rely on software to perform
nearly any task which also enables them to communicate
with each other, especially over a network like the Internet.
Therefore, from a connection point of view, any computer on
the Internet is somehow connected to any other computer on
the Internet. This allows for attacks from around the world,
resulting in security exploits such as data breaches, denial of
service attacks, and credential phishing. In most cases, security
faults exists due to insecure software, allowing attackers to
perform actions they would not be able to do otherwise.
Services and applications which run on the (public) cloud
have negligible downtime and hence are prone to attacks. For
example, authenticating to a service, reading and writing data,
or performing computations and spreading to other systems.
One reason for this situation is that the software employed
today is very complex, reaching up to millions of lines of code
for a single program. Hence, software is difficult to manage
and verify at scale regarding their security. On the other
hand, software developers often provide updates and patches
to enhance and further secure their products. These should
be installed as soon as possible to prevent attacks, especially
on systems connected to the Internet. Unfortunately, there is
also software running which is not maintained anymore and
the only option for a user to be secure may be to switch to
another software.
Since the advent of cloud computing, software is offered
by cloud providers as a service (CSP, cloud service provider),
for example Software at a Service (SaaS) or Platform as a
Service (PaaS). In those cases, the user does not administrate
the software and relies on the provider to install updates.
Due to the advancements in browser technology, web ser-
vices and applications have become a central part of computer
usage and hence an attractive target for hackers, since they
often are publicly accessible. Services running on the Internet
or a cloud cover a range of applications, for example the
popular content management system (CMS) Wordpress [1],
the most used programming language on the web, PHP [2]
(about 79% of all web pages [3]), databases like MySQL [4],
or services used by the system such as SMTP [5]. To offer a
fair usage, these services have to be available over the Internet
all the time at any place. This, however, attracts attackers while
continuously new security flaws are discovered. For example,
the CVE database contains over 6000 vulnerabilities for PHP
alone [6]. Besides flaws, new versions with vastly improved
security features are released that should be used over old
versions. Additionally, some versions like PHP 5 and 7.0 will
be no longer supported and should be updated as soon as
possible [7]. Distributed public services also must be updated
to fix security flaws, such as Bitcoin to prevent direct financial
loss [8].
In conclusion, updating software is a foundation of todays
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security and part of the Internet in general. Due to the service
oriented structure of the cloud updating becomes the task of
the service provider, who, in turn, wants to minimize costs and
avoid configuration and dependency changes. If the provider
is careless, there will be time windows for attacks. To cover
this problem, CSPs blank out the version information on the
service, i.e., employing security by obfuscation. But this makes
it also difficult for the honest customer who may wonder if
the most recent software version is running on the service,
e.g., to run own applications on top. Of course, the customer
can query the provider or the software itself for the version
information, but both may answer whatever the provider wants
the customer to believe. This is crucial since the customer
thinks she gets the version number, while in reality she may
be receiving an arbitrary string. Obviously, such a CSP may
violate the mutual agreed Service Level Agreements (SLA),
but customer may need some time to detect this behavior.
Ultimately, it comes down to the following question: How
can a customer of a remote software reliably and efficiently
prove that the service provider is behaving correctly, i.e., runs
software in the correct version? In other words, the customer’s
goal is to identify the running software, i.e., determine its
version number. Various methods cope with the problem of
finding and detecting insecure software, mainly vulnerability
scanner (e.g., Nessus [9]) and penetration tests. The first are
looking for known security flaws (e.g., CVE) but require
certain access roles or structural execution, such as execution
on the CSPs machine by the CSP. The latter search for
exploits like insufficient parsing of input values. While this
can be performed by external parties, default interfaces are
used to determine the version number of a software (e.g., by
Metasploit [10] or Burp Suite [11]). In fact, existing solutions
do not provide a sufficient level of security and can easily be
fooled by a malicious service provider (see Section II-D.
In this paper, we will present the Reverse Fingerprinting
(RFP) scheme as an answer to the postulated question. RFP
does not rely on versioning interfaces or the support of the
CSP to determine the software version number. Overall, we
give the following contributions:
Formalization of Software and Versioning
We formalize software in general as finite state
machines (FSM), where each software is represented
by a unique FSM with a version number as label.
This allows us to include software development
properties, such as co-existent version numbers, i.e.,
branching, and deprecated software, which otherwise
makes differentiating between any software version
challenging.
Fingerprinting Techniques and Classification
We analyze existing software fingerprinting tech-
niques and group them into classes. We further show
that each existing fingerprinting technique lacks se-
curity properties to guarantee determination of the
software version number. As a solution, we introduce
three novel secure fingerprinting techniques.
Remote Software Identification (RSI)
We give a formal framework for RSI including
system model, attacker model, and protocol.
Reverse Fingerprinting (RFP)
As the main contribution of this paper, we present
Reverse Fingerprinting, a novel scheme that can be
employed as a building block for RSI. It enables au-
diting of the provider, provably yielding the actual in-
stalled software version. RFP leverages a challenge-
response protocol that relies on intrinsic functions
of each individual software version to distinguish
between them. A specifically created database holds
all tests, which are applied using various strategies
resulting in a sequence of tests. Furthermore, RFP
randomizes challenges, verifies time constraints of
responses, and is applicable over multiple interfaces
and software types. We also present extensions of
RFP, such as including an auditor to take away
computational and storage burden of the customer.
Formal Security Analysis
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
providing a security analysis of fingerprinting tech-
niques and an RSI scheme, i.e., RFP. We show
that RFP is secure against CSP response caching
and precomputation, proxy-forwarding of challenges,
and erroneous halts, while determining reliably the
remote software version.
Implementation and Real-World-Applicability
We provide insights in how to build a database for
RFP and give examples for strategies, which describe
the order to perform software version dependent
tests. Additionally, we apply RFP to real-world ap-
plications and show that RFP increases the security
overall.
II. REAL-WORLD SITUATION
We will now define software versioning, fingerprinting, and
software identification as foundation for following sections.
Furthermore, we summarize state of the art fingerprinting
techniques and demonstrate their shortcomings with a practical
attack.
A. Software Versioning
For now, let software be an algorithm or a machine which is
in some state, receives inputs, performs processing, changes to
other states, and yields an output. We give a formal definition
of software in Section III. When a software reaches a certain
state, it gets assigned a unique label.
Definition 1 (Software Version and Software Family): A
software version is a label, e.g., a text string or a number,
assigned by the software developer that uniquely identifies a
certain state of a software. Each software belongs to a set of
softwares, called a software family, where each member of the
set has the same software version ancestor.
A software version label may consist of both a name in and
a number, e.g. Windows Vista for Windows 6.0 Build 6000.
However, most modern software sticks to semantic versioning
[12] for releases. Briefly, a version number is formatted as
Major.Minor.Patch, where Major, Minor, and Patch
are numbers. Major is increased when incompatible API
changes are made, Minor when backwards-compatible func-
tionalities are added, and Patch when backwards-compatible
bugs are fixed. At the end, we are interested in the version
number, not the label.
Let v := (v(0), v(1), v(2)) be a software version, where
v(0), v(1), v(2) are elements from a totally ordered set, e.g., N0,
represented by Major, Minor, and Patch. Let V be the set
of all software versions belonging to the same software family.
For v, v′ ∈ V it holds
v < v′ ⇐⇒
(
v(0) < v
′
(0)
)
or(
v(0) = v
′
(0) ∧ v(1) < v′(1)
)
or(
v(0) = v
′
(0) ∧ v(1) = v′(1) ∧ v(2) < v′(2)
)
,
otherwise we have v ≥ v′. Note that we can map any software
version format to the given structure.
B. Fingerprinting
The identity of an entity, e.g., a person or an object, can be
represented by a unique (digital) fingerprint of the entity itself.
If the identity is not given, a certain amount of information
about the entity is required in order to still build such a
fingerprint. Fingerprinting refers to reliably determining the
fingerprint of an entity.
For example, the identity of a user is combined with
gathering properties of unique characteristics in order to track
the user across multiple websites and devices, in fact relying
on browser configurations and behavior of the user to build
the fingerprint [13]–[15]. Another example are hash values
computed over files – also known as “checksums”. While fin-
gerprinting a user yields the identity of the user, fingerprinting
a software results in the software identity, i.e., the software
version.
C. Auditing and Software Identification
An enormous variety of different software is used everyday
nearly in every part of our life. For example, software is
employed on the Internet, the cloud, computers, smartphones,
Internet of things, networks, storage, automation, industry, etc.
On top, for each use case often multiple software solutions
exist, e.g., MySQL [4] or PostgreSQL [16] for a relational
database. For nearly each software, new versions are being
released continuously, containing new features and fixing
security flaws of previous versions.
Since security flaws are discovered and published every day,
updating the operating software is crucial to have the latest
security updates installed. Hackers and automated attacks
regularly exploit outdated software vulnerabilities resulting in
data breaches, data loss, or functional disability, to name a
few. Furthermore, a software may depend on other software
with a certain software versions, implicitly relying on a correct
determination of the version number in order to work properly.
Consequently, checking whether the latest software version
is running or not is a standard task in almost all auditing
processes. Auditing refers to performing a check on the
software and to convince the verifying party, e.g., the customer,
that the software provider is compliant to some kind of service
level agreement (SLA), i.e., providing a software in a certain
version. In other words, auditing yields the correct software
version of the running software, where correct refers to the
most recent version or the version they agreed on in the SLA.
Hence, we need to perform fingerprinting of the software to
perform this kind of audit, since this will result in the software
version. The process of software fingerprinting gives a solution
to Remote Software Identification (RSI).
D. Shortcomings of State of the Art Solutions
In order to solve the problem of RSI, many different
solutions have already been developed and implemented. A
description of different implementations and an overview of
related work can be found in Section VII. As mentioned
before, fingerprinting can be achieved in many different ways,
we call a method to obtain a fingerprint a fingerprint technique.
For software, a fingerprint technique aims to determine the
software version of the currently running software. This is
usually achieved by sending a request to the running software
and evaluating its response to finally output the software
version.
To the best of our knowledge, state of the art solutions
employ one or more fingerprint techniques out of four different
general types of fingerprinting techniques, denoted as class.
We now will assign all existing fingerprinting techniques to
one of the four classes and elaborate class specific proper-
ties. Each fingerprinting technique is described in detail in
Appendix A, the according subsection is given in parentheses
below.
Class 1: Version Label-Depending Techniques
This class of fingerprinting techniques asks the au-
dited software to yield a static output containing its
version label, usually in form of a string, e.g., the
footer of a website. The determined software version
is the returned label.
Fingerprinting techniques: Version Claim (A1), Ver-
sion API (A2), Version Specific Features (A3), Sub-
Software (A4), and Error Code (A5).
Class 2: Output Function-Depending Techniques
This class of fingerprinting techniques asks the au-
dited software to output certain static values, e.g.,
one or more files characteristic for a certain version
number. Next, theses values are evaluated, for ex-
ample matched by regular expressions or used as
input into a hash function (file checksum). At the
end, the result is compared to already known values
computed beforehand which yields the determined
software version.
Fingerprinting techniques: File Structure/Content
(B1), File Hash Digest (B2), Sub-Software (A4), and
Error Code (A5).
Class 3: Transition Function-Depending Techniques
This class of fingerprinting techniques requires the
audited software to perform certain functions that
are available only for certain software versions in
a static order. Then, multiple requests are employed
to deduce a range of software versions.
Fingerprinting technique: Static Function Output
(C1).
Class 4: Security Flaw-Depending Techniques
In this class, security flaws of certain software ver-
sions are exploited in order to determine the version
number. Note that if a security flaw leads to a halt
of the software, e.g., crash or deadlock, no further
tests can be performed.
Fingerprinting technique: Security Exploit (D1).
Let us briefly discuss the security of these four classes in
regard of reliably determining the software version. A full
security analysis of all four classes is given in Appendix D1.
The first class is forwarding a value being output by the
software without any further check, that is the verifier believes
everything the software replies. The second class is similar to
the first one, with the difference that the output of the software
is transformed in some form, e.g., by applying filters. While
both classes claim to be software version-dependent, the third
class requires not only static values from the software, but also
some form of behavior. However, note that this behavior may
be precomputed by a malicious software or may be easily1
malformed, too. Finally, the fourth class is not a reliable choice
for fingerprinting, because exploiting a security flaw that is not
yet fixed in the installed software version (which may be the
case for all but the newest) will (maybe unintentionally) crash
the software. Hence, the verifier gains not much information
about the actual software version (maybe except that it is not
the newest one). To the best of our knowledge, class 3 is only
done by one implementation [17], and class 4 is only used by
malicious users to attack software.
At the end, no class is fulfilling the goal of RSI if the
software or the party running the software is malicious. The
reasons are mainly that these techniques are either relying on
static values chosen by the provider, i.e., values that do not
depend on the randomness of the verifier, or the reply can be
precomputed or faked easily.
E. Practical Attack on Fingerprinting Techniques
We will now give an example on how to trick RSI im-
plementations that employ a Class 1 fingerprinting technique,
such as Version Claim. As described above and shown in
Appendix D1, a Class 1 fingerprint technique is not secure
since it relies on fixed strings chosen by the provider.
Let us assume the software provider runs a software that
is used by a customer who is going to audit the software. In
this example, the software employed is PHP [2] in version
7.1.1 running on the operating system Ubuntu [18] in version
1For example, an easy to fake function may return a certain configuration
value introduced with a given software version.
Fig. 1. The version scanner WhatRuns determines the version number of the
PHP engine processing an HTML page. The scanner outputs PHP 20.9.85
(red bordered value) and does not detect the additional Patch information
(-car), while in fact PHP 7.1.1 is running. As a side note, version scanners
are also tricked by the changed version number of Apache (also 20.9.85).
16.04.3. We have chosen the programming language PHP,
since about 79% of all websites are processed by PHP [3].
Next, the provider runs the bash script in Listing 3 (cf.
Appendix I) to manipulate the version number of PHP to the
value 20.9.85-car, adding even extra version info to Patch.
Then, the PHP functions phpinfo() and phpversion()
as well as any related function with the goal to output the
softare version, will return 20.9.85-car.
At the time of writing, PHP 7 is the highest available major
software version of PHP, so the fake is quite obvious. However,
as a result every implementation of RSI that relies on static
information will yield the faked value instead the real one.
As expected, this behavior can be seen by using, for example,
the version scanner WhatRuns [19] and visiting an example
HTML page containing nothing else than ’Hello World!’, see
Figure 1. This demonstrates the contradiction of the current
state of the art techniques and the goal they try to achieve:
reliably determining the actual software version.
III. REMOTE SOFTWARE IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we describe the formal framework for
Remote Software Identification (RSI). All communication is
done over an authenticated and encrypted channel, e.g., by
employing TLS.
A. System Model
We assume that a verifier has remote access to some
software hosted by a service provider and wants to determine
whether the correct software is running. Due to the fact that
access is remote, the only channel of information available is
to observe the input-output-behavior of the hosted software.
To this end, we model software as a finite state machine with
outputs:
Definition 2 (FSM with Outputs): A finite state machine M
with outputs (FSM for short) is defined by a six-tuple
(Z, z0,Σ,Γ, δ, ω)
where
• Z is the set of states with z0 ∈ Z being the start state,
• Σ denotes the (finite) input alphabet,
• Γ denotes the (finite) output alphabet,
• δ : Z × Σ→ Z is the state transition function, and
• ω : Z × Σ→ Γ is the output function.
At the beginning, the FSM M is initialized to state z0. Then,
the verifier can send input σ ∈ Σ to M and receives output
γ ∈ Γ. More formally, assume that M is in some state z and
that the user sends an input σ. Then, M produces an output
γ = ω(z, σ) and updates its state to δ(z, σ).
We extend the notation of the output function as follows
to reflect sequences. Given a state z ∈ Z and a sequence
~σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Σn, we define
ω(z, ~σ) = ~γ = (γ1, . . . , γn)
where there exists a sequence of states z1, . . . , zn such that
z1 = z, zi+1 = δ(zi, σi) for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, and γj =
ω(zj , σj) for j = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, we will usually omit
the state if we refer to the start state z0, that is
ω(~σ) := ω(z0, ~σ).
Sometimes, we need to distinguish between the output func-
tions of different FSMs. In such a case, we will write ωM
instead of ω to make clear that we talk about the output
function of a certain FSM M .
Recall that the only information a verifier gets about a
FSM is its input-output-behavior. Consequently, we define
equivalence of FSMs according to the observable outputs.
Definition 3 (Equivalence of FSMs): Consider two FSMs
M and M ′, both defined over the same input alphabet Σ and
output alphabet Γ. Let ~σ ∈ Σ∗. We say that M and M ′ are
equivalent with respect to ~σ (expressed by M ≡~σ M ′) if
ωM (~σ) = ωM ′(~σ). Analogously, we define for a set E ⊆ Σ∗
that
M ≡E M ′ ⇐⇒ M ≡~σ M ′ ∀ ~σ ∈ E.
Finally, two FSMs are equivalent, i.e., M ≡ M ′, if M ≡Σ∗
M ′.
B. Attacker Model
The audited software is operated by the prover P, i.e.,
software provider, according to some previously agreed on
SLA with the customer or verifier. In general, he wants to
always let the latest software version. However, this implies
installing updates, software, or new configurations which re-
sults in system changes that can impact the rest of the system
platform and creates a financial burden for the prover. For
example, software dependencies may change, configurations
will be altered, and functionalities will be added and removed
as well. Therefore, the prover is motivated to act economically
driven, that is, to reduce the number of system changes.
Hence, the rational attacker model applies to the prover. In
other words, he may alter the running software to fake a
certain software version. For example, by employing security
by obscurity, the prover might use version blinding, i.e., hide
or forge the software’s version. Also, the prover could simulate
some functions to convince the verifier that another software
version is running.
The second party, the verifier V, wants to identify the
software operated by the prover and represents a trusted party.
When detecting misbehavior by the prover according to the
SLA, i.e., a not secure software version, she might for example
take legal actions. Observe that learning which software is
being run also allows to perform tailored attacks on the service.
However, we only focus on determining the identity of the
software, the actions performed with this knowledge are out
of scope of this work.
C. Remote Software Identification
RSI is defined with respect to a set M of pairwise non-
equivalent FSMs and a target FSM Mtrg together with two
parties: a prover P and a verifier V. Both parties know the
specifications of the FSMs contained in M. The prover P is
providing to V remote access to a challenge FSM Mchl and
V has to decide (essentially) if Mchl = Mtrg. We are going
to make this more precise now.
RSI is divided into two phases: a setup phase and a
verification phase. We assume that prior to these phases, a set
M of pairwise distinct FSMs and a target FSM Mtrg ∈ M
have been agreed upon.
In the setup phase, P selects a source FSM Msrc ∈M and
produces a challenge FSM Mchl := Produce(M∗) ∈M from
some FSM M∗ ∈M. Note that Mchl might not be an element
of the same software family as Msrc and M∗ anymore, since
Produce might produce a FSM that is a new combination of
distinct FSMs of the same software family. In the simplest
case, it holds that Mchl = Msrc, but we will also discuss the
case that Mchl may be a modification of Msrc, i.e., Mchl 6=
Msrc.
In the verification phase, V interacts with Mchl (which is
run by P) as described above. That is, V can send inputs ~σ
to Mchl and receives the corresponding outputs ~γ. We assume
furthermore that V can reset Mchl, that is to set its state back
to z0. Eventually, V outputs a decision δ ∈ {true,false}
whether it interacts with the correct FSM or not, i.e., if it holds
Msrc = Mtrg.
Definition 4 (RSI Protocol, Correctness, and Soundness):
Given the set of pairwise distinct FSMs M and a target FSM
Mtrg ∈M, we define the RSI protocol ΠRSI as
ΠRSI : [V : ~σ; P: Mchl,Msrc] −→ [V : δ; P: ⊥],
where the verifier V sends the input sequence ~σ to the FSM
Mchl that is controlled by the prover P, as is the FSM Msrc.
At the end, V will output a decision δ ∈ {true,false}
which is only true if Msrc = Mtrg. The prover’s output is
empty (⊥). We say V is ΠRSI-correct if it holds
Pr [δ = true |Msrc = Mtrg] = 1
and V is called ΠRSI-ε0-sound if it holds
Pr [δ = true |Msrc 6= Mtrg] ≤ ε0,
where ε0 depends on the security parameter λ.
We discuss now the different existing possibilities for en-
abling an RSI scheme. To this end, we will first focus on
the case that Mchl = Msrc. That is V is given remote access
to an FSM Mchl ∈ M and has to decide based on selected
inputs ~σ and corresponding outputs ~γ whether Mchl = Mtrg.
Obviously, the only possible approach for the verifier is to
use inputs such that the outputs differ between the different
FSMs in order to come to a decision. This gives raise to the
following notion.
Definition 5 (Distinguishing Sequence): Let M be a set of
FSMs, all being defined over the same input alphabet Σ and
output alphabet Γ, and of size at least two. We call a sequence
~σ ∈ Σ∗ a distinguishing sequence with respect to M if there
exist M,M ′ ∈M such that ωM (~σ) 6= ωM ′(~σ). Moreover, we
define by DS(M) ⊆ Σ∗ the set of all distinguishing sequences.
We say that a sequence ~σ ∈ Σ∗ is non-distinguishing if ~σ 6∈
DS(M).
The motivation behind distinguishing sequences is that they
are the only means for a verifier to solve the RSI problem, i.e.,
determining if Msrc = Mtrg. In other words, we can restrict
to verifiers that only use distinguishing sequences as inputs.
Theorem 1: Consider an RSI instance given by a set M of
pairwise distinct FSMs and a target FSM Mtrg ∈ M. Let V
be a verifier for the RSI problem which is ΠRSI-correct and
ΠRSI-ε0-sound. Then there exists a verifier V′ that is likewise
ΠRSI-correct and ΠRSI-ε0-sound and works analogously to V
with the only exception that it omits all non-distinguishing
sequences used by V.
Proof: We show the claim by specifying V′. Recall that
V′ knows the specifications of the FSMs contained inM. One
consequence is that V′ can decide for a given input sequence ~σ
whether it is a distinguishing sequence or not. This algorithm
uses V and simulates all inputs and outputs for V as follows.
When V uses as input a distinguishing sequence ~σ ∈ DS(M),
the algorithm V′ forwards this input to Mchl and the received
output back to V. Whenever V uses a non-distinguishing
sequence as input, V′ computes the corresponding output on
its own using the known specifications of the FSMs and
returns the result to V. Eventually, when V outputs true
or false, then V′ outputs the same value. Obviously, V′
perfectly simulates ΠRSI for V and hence “inherits” the same
correctness and soundness properties.
Theorem 1 shows that the task of solving the RSI problem
boils down to two procedures for the verifier:
• Design: Find and construct distinguishing sequences for
appropriate sub-sets of M;
• Strategy: Decide on a strategy on how to successively
sort out candidates for Msrc (from Mchl).
Note that current auditing processes for identifying the soft-
ware version follow this principle. Asking the software for its
version number can be interpreted as making a distinguishing
input. However, as pointed out in Section II-E it is easy for a
malicious provider to tamper with the software, e.g., to fake the
response to the software version request. In the next section,
we explain a novel approach for realizing RSI even in the
context of more powerful adversaries.
IV. REVERSE FINGERPRINTING
We will first motivate Reverse Fingerprinting (RFP), explain
its basic idea, then define the RFP scheme RFP with all
including protocols and procedures as well as incorporating
software development specific properties, and finally give a
security analysis to show that RFP solves the RSI-problem.
Recall that according to the definition of RSI, the provider
as prover P grants the verifier V access to Mchl =
Produce(Msrc). That is, a provider may modify Msrc in this
process to produce Mchl, especially it holds then Mchl 6= Msrc.
For example, installing additional software that checks for
certain inputs, e.g., that asks for the version number, and
returns a forged value. Within the framework explained in the
previous section, this would mean that certain input sequences
do not yield a distinguishing sequence anymore. As we have
shown, it is mandatory for any verification algorithm to design
distinguishing sequences. Thus, whether RSI is still possible
or not strongly depends on (i) how P can affect the sets of
distinguishing sequences and (ii) to what extent one can still
design distinguishing sequences.
To illustrate this, let us consider the following example.
Let M = {M0,M1} be a pair of distinct FSMs over the
same input and output alphabets and let Mtrg = M0. Assume
that P picks as source Msrc = M1 but that M0 = Mchl =
Produce(M1) holds. That is, P applies a total conversion to
M1 and transforms it into M0. Obviously, now it becomes
impossible to distinguish between the cases Msrc = M0 and
Msrc = M1. Thus, RSI is only possible if P applies “modest”
changes at most to the FSM. This malicious actions bring us
to RFP.
A. Basic Idea
We have designed RFP for exactly such cases, where
Mchl 6= Msrc. More precisely, it is based on the observation
that extensive modifications of a software would contradict the
economic incentives of P. For instance, the total conversion
of one FSM into another explained above would not be
meaningful as it would be more simple and also cheaper
to install M0 right from the start. The idea of RFP is that
without extensive modifications, a software keeps its intrinsic
functionalities and behavior.
The goal of RFP is to identify the remotely running software
(FSM Msrc), that is to determine its software version by
communicating over basic interfaces (FSM Mchl).2 The result
can then be compared to a target software version (FSM Mtrg)
in order to determine if the prearranged software version is
running. Hence, RFP is a building block to realize ΠRSI
and is a new approach to solve the RSI problem. Reverse
Fingerprinting incorporates the following features:
• RFP performs multiple times a challenge-response pro-
tocol to successively decrease the verifier’s insecurity of
the audited software’s version number;
2Please note that the software provider might use RFP to audit himself.
This allows him to prove his claims and, e.g., allows for certifications.
• for a challenge, RFP uses input σ to leverage the func-
tionality of intrinsic processes of the audited software
which are hard to simulate;
• for a response, RFP expects a certain output γ of the
audited software within a certain time frame depending
on σ and the therein included randomness φ;
• RFP incorporates software versioning hierarchies and
software development properties to eliminate false posi-
tives;
• at the end, RFP evaluates all tuples of challenges and
responses to determine a software version candidate set
C;
• in comparison to state of the art, RFP is secure against
caching, pre-computation, proxy-forwarding, and erro-
neous halts, of course in addition to determining the
software version of Msrc.
B. Reverse Fingerprinting Scheme
First, we will formalize the capabilities of P for the algo-
rithm Produce, that is, simulating behavior of a FSM which
is different from Msrc, i.e., Mchl 6= Msrc.
Definition 6 (Simulation-Hard Functions): Let M ∈ M be
a FSM over the input alphabet Σ and output alphabet Γ. We
call the union of all state transition functions δ and output
functions ω the set of functions F of M and denote this by
F : Z × Σ→ Z ∪ Γ,
where Z is the set of states. By FM we denote the function set
of the FSM M . Let M ′ = Produce(M) ∈M be a FSM with
FM ′ 6= FM that is also run by P. We say that P can perform
Produce if it matches his economically incentives, that is
installing the real target or newer software version will cost at
most the same time and/or money for P as implementing or
simulating its functions via Produce. Therefore, F ′M contains
a set of simulation-hard functions in respect to P that can
not be constructed via Produce, but can only be the identical
functions of M . We denote the set of simulation-hard functions
by F ?M ′ ⊂ FM ′ , or if the FSM is given in the context by
F ? ⊂ F.
In other words, simulation-hard functions are inherent func-
tions of a FSM M which can not efficiently be simulated or
produced by P via Produce. That is, given a simulation-hard
function f of a target FSM Mtrg, then Mchl = Produce(Msrc)
will not have the function f , i.e., F ?Mtrg 6= F ?Mchl , unless
Mtrg = Msrc. It follows that this method allows us to
distinguish FSMs.
Since RFP aims to determine a candidate set of possible
software versions of Msrc, we will write vM to denote the
software version v of a FSM M . Let vM ∈ Γ such that
it can be an output of M . For the sake of readability, we
define a software S to be the tuple of a FSM M and the
corresponding version vM , i.e. S := (M,vM ). Let S˜ be the
set of all softwares and let
S := SS = {S0, . . . , Sn} ⊂ S˜
denote the software family of S, i.e., the set of all valid
softwares and corresponding versions belonging to the same
software ancestor S, e.g., all PHP versions or all WordPress
versions. We assume that the software family is always given
by the environment, since the goal of RFP is to distinguish
between different software versions, but not to determine the
software family. Let further V := VS be the set of all software
versions of S.
Recall that a distinguishing sequence DS(S) is used by
the verifier to distinguish between two FSMs of S (see
Definition 5). However, due to the attacker model of P and the
properties of Produce, a distinguishing sequence may not be
able to distinguish between two completely different software
versions. That is, a P may construct Mchl = Produce(Msrc)
by simulating functions of Mchl that are not given in the source
FSM Msrc. This motivates the extension of distinguishing
sequences by simulation-hard functions given as follows:
Definition 7 (Distinguishing Sequence over Simulation-Hard
Functions): Let S be a given software family and S ∈ S, S′ ∈
S˜ over the same input alphabet Σ and output alphabet Γ. We
call a sequence ~σ ∈ Σ∗ a distinguishing series over simulation-
hard functions such that ωS(~σ) 6= ωS′(~σ), where each output
value γi depends on a simulation-hard function f ∈ F ?S . We
define by DSH(S) ⊆ Σ∗ the set of all distinguishing series
over simulation-hard functions for a software S.
Next, we define the RFP scheme RFP that is initiated by
the verifier V and consists of three procedures Setup, Test, and
Output. An overview of RFP and its subsidiary procedures
as well as protocols is depicted in Figure 2.
Definition 8 (RFP Scheme): Let Schl := (Mchl, vMchl) ∈ S˜
and Ssrc := (Msrc, vMsrc) ∈ S with Mchl = Produce(Msrc)
be the softwares hosted by P. We define the RFP scheme RFP
between V and P as the consecutive procedures Setup, Test,
and Output. At the end, V outputs a software candidate set
C ⊂ S with Ssrc ∈ C.
We say V is RFP-correct if it holds
Pr [vSsrc ∈ C | Schl = Produce(Ssrc)] = 1
and V is called RFP-ε1-sound if it holds
Pr [vSsrc 6∈ C | Schl = Produce(Ssrc)] ≤ ν(ε1)
where ν is a negligible polynomial function in ε1 depending
the security parameter λ. We call RFP secure if it is RFP-
correct, RFP-ε1-sound, ΠRSI-correct, and ΠRSI-ε0-sound.
In the optimal case, we get |C| = 1 in RFP. With the
definition of RFP, we are now able to prove that the existing
four fingerprinting classes presented in Section II-D are not
secure, i.e., RFP-correctness or RFP-soundness are not given
for a verifier V. This can immediately be seen since none of
the classes relies on inputs of DSH, that is the verifier does
not rely on intrinsic functions and hence can be fooled. Please
refer to Appendix D1 a detailed analysis of all state of the
art fingerprinting techniques. We will now describe the three
procedures of Setup, Test, and Output in detail.
RFP Scheme RFP
Verifier V Prover P
Setup
S ⊂ S˜, Strg ∈ S, I ⊆ I∗ S ⊂ S˜, Strg ∈ S, I ⊆ I∗
select Φ Ssrc ∈ S
create DS ∈ D Schl ← Produce(Ssrc) ∈ S˜
choose Θ
Test
I ⊆ I
D = D(S, I) ∈ DS
∆← ∅
θ ∈ Θ
ΠRFP:
S ← θ(D,∆)

if S = ∅ go to Output
(c, e, t)← D[S]
φ←R Φ, t′ ← now
c(φ)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
e′ ← Schl(c(φ))
e′←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
t′ ← now− t′
δ ←
{
true e′ = e ∧ t′ ≤ t,
false else.
∆← ∆ ∪ (S, δ)
go to ΠRFP
Output
C ← Output(S,∆)
Fig. 2. Protocol representation of the RFP scheme RFP between verifier V (user) and prover P (service provider). A database entry D[S] relies on at
least one function f ∈ F?I (vS) ∪ F?B(vS) ∪ F?D(vS), where vS is the software version of S (see Section IV-F). The secret and public keys of each party
are omitted, and the values of I, Strg, and S are agreed on in the SLA beforehand. Public values are the sets of all softwares S˜ and all interfaces I∗.
Fingerprinting techniques are involved in the creation of DS .
C. The Setup Procedure
This randomized procedure generates for each the verifier
V and provider P a public-private key pair. If a party only
deploys symmetric key schemes, the public key is simply set
to ⊥. For the sake of brevity, we implicitly assume for each of
the subsequent protocols and procedures that an involved party
always uses as inputs its own secret key and the public key
of the other party. Furthermore, the set of all softwares S˜ is
produced by the environment and the software family S ⊂ S˜
is given to both parties as well as a target software Strg ∈ S
(which, in practice, is chosen beforehand as part of an SLA).
By I we denote an interface, that is a (possibly authenticated)
communication channel between a party and a software. Let
I∗ be the set of all interfaces. We define the procedure Setup
between a verifier V and prover P by
Setup : [V : ⊥; P: ⊥] −→ [V : I,Φ,D,Θ; P: I, Ssrc, Schl].
During Setup, V and P first determine which interfaces I ⊆
I∗ they are able to use as communication channels between
V and Schl and output them. For example, I may consist of
FTP [20] and HTTP [21] with according authentication and
implementation details. Different interfaces allow for differ-
ent communication channels, that is, depending on the soft-
ware and authorization, certain fingerprinting techniques and
simulation-hard functions are available for certain interfaces
only. For example, an authenticated channel grants usually
more privileges compared to an unauthenticated channel, e.g.
customer and guest, respectively. The prover P takes the
source software Ssrc ∈ S and computes the challenge software
Schl = Produce(Ssrc) ∈ S˜, where his goal is to convince the
verifier that Schl = Strg. The verifier V obtains a source of
randomness Φ, constructs a set of databases D, and defines a
set of strategies Θ. An database D ∈ D in RFP is defined as
follows:
Definition 9 (Database): Let S be a given software family
and I ⊆ I∗ be some interfaces agreed on by V and P.
Let further DSH(S, I) ⊆ Σ∗S(I) be the set of distinguishing
sequences over simulation-hard functions for a software S and
an interface I ∈ I, where Σ∗S(I) ⊆ Σ∗S is the restricted set
of all input values for S in respect to I . By DSH(S, I) we
denote the restriction of DSH(S) to an interface I .
We call c(S, F ?S ,Φ, Ic) ∈ DSH(S, Ic) a randomized chal-
lenge for a software S ∈ S and interface Ic ∈ I sent from V
to Schl, which employs a randomness source Φ as auxiliary
input and depends on at least one simulation-hard function
f ∈ F ?S of S. We will omit parameters from now on if they
are clear from the context.
By e(c, Ie) ∈ ωS(c) we denote the expected response from
Schl to the challenge c from V for a software S ∈ S . In
general, it holds Ie 6= Ic.
Finally, we define a database by:
D(S, I ′) := {(c, e, t)S | c = c(S, F ?S ,Φ, Ic) ∈ DSH(S, Ic),
e = e(c, Ie) ∈ ωS(c), S ∈ S,
Ic, Ie ∈ I ′, t ∈ N0},
where t is a number of time units and I ′ ⊆ I. A database
D is called perfect, if it holds |D| = |S|. We abbreviate by
D := DS = {D(S, I ′) | I ′ ⊆ I} the set of all databases for
S, and by D[S] := (c, e, t)S ∈ D(S, I ′) the database entry
belonging to a software S ∈ S for some interface.
Note that since the verifier constructs D, he also computes
the expected responses. Also, two database entries for two
different software versions in the same database may employ
four different interfaces. A source of randomness allows to
insert random values into a challenge depending on the coins
of Φ, which makes the challenge and especially the accord-
ing correct response hard to predict. Designing a database
D(S, I ′) ∈ D represents the first task for V resulting from
Theorem 1. In Section V-B, we describe how to design a
database for RFP.
Finally, a strategy θ ∈ Θ describes a way how to traverse
entries in a database D to successively sort out candidates in
C to reach Ssrc, depending on the responses given by Schl. In
other words, a strategy yields a distinguishing sequence over
simulation-hard functions DSH for any S ∈ S . We will give
a formal definition of a strategy below, see Definition 11.
D. The Test Procedure
This randomized procedure takes as input the outputs of
Setup, that is the set of interfaces I for V and P, the source
of randomness Φ, set of databases D, and set of strategies Θ
for V, and the challenge software Schl for P. At the end, the
verifier outputs set of decisions ∆ for each software version
that has been tested against Schl. We now formally define
testing, that is on processing an entry of a database, the verifier
performs a challenge-response protocol ΠRFP which we define
as follows:
Definition 10 (RFP Protocol): Let S be a given software
family, δ ∈ {true,false} be a decision set, and t′ be a
measure of time units. We define the RFP protocol between
the verifier V and prover P as
ΠRFP : [V : D[S],Φ; P: Schl] −→ [V : δ; P: ⊥],
for a database entry D[S] ∈ D(S, I) with S ∈ S and a set of
interfaces I, and a randomness source Φ. ΠRFP consists of
three steps for the verifier V, which we call an RFP test:
1) send a randomized challenge c(φ) ∈ D[S] with φ ∈R Φ;
2) receive a response e′ from Schl after t′ time units,
otherwise set e′ = ⊥ if t′ passes some time threshold;
3) fetch e ∈ D[S] and output δ, where δ ← true iff e′ = e
and t′ ≤ t, otherwise δ ← false.
We can now perform a single RFP test via ΠRFP, which
yields a single outcome δ for a certain software S. First,
observe that a challenge c of a database entry depends on
S, which in fact means that the intrinsic behavior of S is
being tested. However, as we have shown in Section II-D,
state of the art fingerprinting techniques will not be sufficient.
Hence, we introduce new fingerprinting techniques fulfilling
RFP security, see Section V-A. Second, observe that ΠRFP
will not yield the software version of Ssrc. That is, usually, the
amount of software features grows over time with the software
versions of S , hence testing a single software S in ΠRFP
will indeed yield true or false, i.e., if a certain simulation-
hard function can be performed correctly, but is not sufficient
to determine the software version of Ssrc. Consequently, if it
holds δ = false, we learn that the software version is smaller
than the one of S, and in the case of δ = true, Ssrc might
be equal to S, but there might also be a newer version S′ ∈ S
with vS′ > vS , for which ΠRFP also yields δ = true. Hence,
as a core part of RFP, ΠRFP is performed multiple times.
RFP leverages a database of challenges and expected re-
sponses in combination with a strategy to produce a certain
distinguishing sequence of simulation-hard functions DSH for
each S ∈ S. In other words, each S ∈ S can be determined
by testing the simulation-hard functions of multiple, different
software versions in S until we get a lower and upper limit
for the software version of Ssrc. When performing multiple
tests using ΠRFP, the verifier tracks each software-decision-
pair (S, δ) in a decision log ∆. We combine the multiple tests
by defining the procedure Test as follows:
Test : [V : I,Φ,D,Θ; P: I, Schl] −→ [V : ∆; P: ⊥].
Essentially, Test consists of multiple executions of ΠRFP,
where the order of the softwares that are being tested by ΠRFP
is defined by a strategy θ ∈ Θ. We will now explain the general
concept of a strategy in detail.
At the beginning, when performing ΠRFP for the first time,
V needs to choose a S0 ∈ S to start from. Then, depending
on the outcome δ0 of ΠRFP for S0 and a given database, the
task of choosing the next software S1 is to be solved. In other
words, V searches for S1 depending on (S0, δ0). In general,
we want to determine the next software that has to be tested to
reduce the set of possible software candidates for the source
software Ssrc. More formally, we are looking for Si for a given
log ∆ = {(S0, δ0), . . . , (Si−1, δi−1)}. We solve this problem
by using a strategy which we formally define as follows:
Definition 11 (Strategy): Let Schl be the challenge software
hosted by P and ∆ = ∅. We denote by δΠRFP(S) the output of
ΠRFP for a software S ∈ S, a given randomness source φ, a
database D(S, I) ∈ D for a software family S and interfaces
I.
Then, a strategy is defined as a method that describes, based
on ∆ and D(S, I), which software S ∈ S is selected for the
next run of ΠRFP.
Let C,C ′ ⊂ S be candidate sets of possible software
versions containing Ssrc, deduced from the current decision
log ∆ and the upcoming one ∆∪ (S, δΠRFP(S)), respectively.
We call a strategy efficient if it holds |C ′| < |C|.
If there exists no further S ∈ S such that the number
of elements in C can be reduced (or a certain threshold
of executions of ΠRFP has been performed), the strategy
commands to end the procedure Test.
Please observe that the dependency on a database for a
strategy is required, since the database may not be perfect, i.e.,
entries for some softwares may be missing. While selecting
any software version for testing is easy, finding efficient
strategies is desired since this reduces the time required as well
as communication and storage overhead for V. Hence, we say
an optimal strategy is represented by requiring the minimum
amount of tests to find Ssrc, i.e., the distinguishing series of
simulation-hard functions DSH for the optimal strategy is at
most as long as any other one DSH′. Note that if ∆ = ⊥,
choosing the starting software version S0 is crucial and
influences the DSH strongly. For example, starting with the
highest software version in D and successively testing step by
step smaller software versions will only be an efficient strategy
if Ssrc has a very recent software version. At the end, Test
employs multiple executions of ΠRFP which produces over
time a distinguishing sequence over simulation-hard functions
of Ssrc, i.e., DSH(Ssrc). Creating a strategy θ ∈ Θ represents
the second task for V resulting from Theorem 1. We give more
information on how to construct strategies in Section V-C.
Observe that given two softwares S, S′ ∈ S with vS < vS′ ,
this does not necessarily imply that S is older or more insecure
than S′ and furthermore it might hold |F (S)| > |F (S′)|. This
is important for the design of a strategy, since there is often
more than one possible “next software version” to choose
from, i.e., the DSH is not always continuous with respect
to the software version number. We cope with the problem
of software version hierarchies and software development in
Section IV-F.
E. The Output Procedure
This procedure gathers the results that have been produced
by Test and outputs a candidate set C ⊂ S which contains
Ssrc. Since we have stored the decision outputs of all ΠRFP
runs in ∆, this procedure consists of two steps: first, a lower
and upper bound of software versions is computed based on
∆ and the software version hierarchy. Second, given these
bounds, we determine all S ∈ S that lie in between the bounds,
finally resulting in C. We denote both steps as the procedure
Output defined as follows:
Output : [V : ∆; P: ⊥] −→ [V : C; P: ⊥].
This procedure is performed by V and independent of P
with the input being the log of decisions ∆ coming from
the procedure Test. With Output, the verifier V outputs a
candidate set C ⊂ S with Ssrc ∈ C, solving the RSI-problem.
Note that the cardinality of C may be greater than one, since
there can be S, S′ ∈ Ssrc with S ≡ S′, as mentioned above in
Section IV-C.
F. Distinguishung Software Hierarchies
Recall that the goal of the verifier is to leverage the set of
simulation-hard functions of each software S ∈ S to construct
a distinguish series, i.e., to distinguish between single software
versions. However, as mentioned before, there exists no simple
ordering of versions of the softwares of a software family. In
other words, how does the verifier know which software ver-
sion is based on other software versions? Here, two challenges
arise due to software development properties, namely software
branches and deprecated functions. Together with simulation-
hard functions, these three describe a software hierarchy over
S. Usually, the set of functions of a newer software version
contains all functions of older software versions. However, due
to software hierarchies, the version number of one software
may be smaller compared to another, while it might be a
newer software. More formally, while there is a ordering
on version numbers, this does not translate to the set of
functions of a software, i.e., there exists S, S′ ∈ S with
vS > vS′ 6⇒ FS ⊃ FS′ . Plus, when a strategy θ ∈ Θ
chooses the next software S ∈ S to test with ΠRFP, then
this decision is based on a database D ∈ D, which entries
must reflect the software hierarchies. Therefore, this raises
the question on how to map software hierarchies to version
fingerprinting, since higher software versions does not always
implicates more or newer functions. We will now describe how
to distinguish between software versions in the presence of
software hierarchy including software development properties.
Since we will now focus on the version properties of a
software, we are using our existing notation but refer to a
software via its version vS instead the software S itself. Let
F (vS) := FS for a software S ∈ S. In software development,
usually the following holds: After implementing a functional-
ity f ∈ FS in a software S, usually all following versions of
the same software family will also have implemented f . More
formally,
f ∈ F (v)⇒ f ∈ (F (v) ∩ F (v′)) ∀ v′ ≥ v, (1)
where v = vS and v′ ∈ V .
Recall that in the protocol ΠRFP, the verifier V sends a
randomized challenge c, receives the response e′ by Schl, and
measures the time passed in between as well as compares e′ to
the expected response e. Since V is essentially testing if Schl
can successfully perform a certain, inherent simulation-hard
function of a software S, it follows due to equation (1) that if
δ = true we have vSchl ≥ vS , i.e., the version of the software
provided (Schl) is at least the on of the software compared to
(S). We denote by δΠRFP(S,f) the output of ΠRFP depending
on software S ∈ S and an employed challenge derived from
a function f ∈ FS :
δΠRFP(S,f) ←
{
true if vSchl ≥ vS ,
false if vSchl < vS .
See Remark 5 on why we decided to use this specific definition
of δ.
At the beginning, i.e., when no RFP test has been performed
yet, the candidate set of all possible software versions C will
be equal to all versions of S, i.e., C = S. Employing ΠRFP
multiple times to test for different softwares S ∈ S using a
database will yield a reduced candidate set C ′ ⊂ C, since the
V learns if Schl supports a certain, version intrinsic function of
S, or not. The final candidate set will be as small as possible,
in the best case it contains only one element.
Definition 12 (Simulation-Hard Intrinsic Functions): For
S ∈ S, let
F?(S) :=
F ?S \
⋃
S′∈S
vS′<vS
FS′
 . (2)
be the set of all simulation-hard intrinsic functions of S that
are new for this software version, i.e., did not exist in a version
before. We set F?(vS) := F?(S).
Observe that all next released software versions, i.e.,
with versions greater than vS , also incorporate F?(S), i.e.,
F?(v) ⊂ F?(v′) with v < v′, v, v′ ∈ V .
Besides checking for a certain simulation-hard intrinsic
function f ∈ F?(S) that is characteristic for that software
version (and following), there are two properties of software
versioning and development to take into account:
1) Software branches, i.e., same function changes are im-
plemented for different version numbers, and
2) Deprecated and removed functions, i.e., functions that
exist only for a few versions of S.
For each of both properties, equation (1) does not hold
anymore. Hence, we will now give new ways to differentiate
between all three cases to determine the outcome of ΠRFP.
For the following three subsections, we set δΠRFP(vS ,f) :=
δΠRFP(S,f), where the challenge employed in ΠRFP depends
on the function f ∈ F?(S). Further, let S ∈ S be a given
software and let v = vS .
1) Intrinsic Functions: For a f ∈ F?(v) let the challenge c
in ΠRFP depend on f . Then, f is an intrinsic simulation-hard
function introduced in version v of S, see also Definition 12.
We define the intrinsic set of S as the set with the intrinsic
properties, that is
F?I (v) := F?(v). (3)
Then, with f ∈ F?I (v), we get
δΠRFP(v,f) =
{
true if vSchl ≥ v,
false if vSchl < v.
We now come to the other remaining cases.
2) Branch Handling: For v > v′ with v′ ∈ V , we might
have F?(v) = F?(v′) because both versions are maintained at
the same time, but live on different branches, e.g., same value
for Major but different values for Minor or Patch. So given
a function f ∈ F?I (v) as in the case for intrinsic functions,
we now at the same time also have f ∈ F?I (v′), which is a
contradiction to Definition 12. Hence, we need to cope in a
new way with this case which we dub branch detection for
versions of S.
To solve this problem, we additionally store for the entry
D[S] in the database a set of branch detecting tests. These
are referrers to other database entries, essentially to a version
where the branch can be determined using F?. We now have
the following relation between two versions:
F?(v) = F?(v′), v > v′. (4)
Recall that F?(v) are all simulation-hard intrinsic functions
that have been added in version v to S. Hence, equation (4)
states that the same features were added to both software
versions v and v′. First, let the database entries for v and v′
contain a challenge depending on f ∈ F?(v). Second, let the
database entry for v contain a branch detecting test referring
to version v̂. Depending on the difference between v and v′,
v̂ has the same values Major and Minor as v, but Patch is
set to zero; or same Major as v and both Minor and Patch
are set to zero. Therefore, v̂ 6= v̂′ means that the softwares of
v and v′ refer to different branch detecting test versions as
their ancestors. To illustrate this, example values can be as
follows: v = (7, 2, 9), v′ = (7, 1, 21), and v̂ = (7, 2, 0). We
define the branched set of S in respect to v′ as
F?B(v, v′) :=
{
f ∈ F?(v) ∩ F?(v′) | v > v′, v̂ 6= v̂′
}
. (5)
Then, with f ∈ F?B(v, v′), g ∈ F?I (v̂), we get
δΠRFP(v,f) =

true if vSchl ≥ v,
true if vSchl ≥ v′,
false if vSchl < v
′.
In case of a true result, we perform ΠRFP a second time,
but with parameters v̂ and g, and get
δΠRFP(v̂,g) =
{
true if vSchl ≥ v,
false if vSchl ≥ v′.
Please note that if there is no g ∈ F?I (v̂), we recursively test
g ∈ F?B(v̂, v̂′) or g ∈ F?D(v̂, v̂′) (see below) for according v̂′
until we reach a version g ∈ F?I (v̂). Further note that if the
branch detection test versions are equal of both versions, i.e.,
v̂ 6= v̂′, then both versions are indistinguishable, i.e., S ≡ S′
with v = vS and v′ = vS′ .
3) Deprecated Functions: Suppose there exists an f ∈
F?I (v), but we also have f 6∈ F?I (v′) with v′ > v. This
is a contradiction to the definition of F?I . Futhermore, f
also cannot be an element of F?B. In other words, f is
only implemented in v. Therefore, we are in the third case
representing deprecated simulation-hard functions. These are
functions which only exist for a certain amount of consecutive
versions, being removed from S afterwards.
In other words, f exists in a version v for all versions up
to another version v′′, but not at any higher version v′. That
is, we have f ∈ F ?(v), f ∈ F ?(v′′), and f 6∈ F ?(v′) with
v ≤ v′′ < v′. We define the depcrecated set of S with respect
to v′ as
F?D(v, v′) := F?(v) \ F?(v′). (6)
Note that a function f ∈ F?D(v, v′) can be re-introduced after
version v′ later on, which requires to analogously adapt this
equation.
To incorporate this case in ΠRFP, we add to the database
for entry D[S] a referrer to a function-deprecated test version,
representing a test for version v′, being the version of the
first released software S′ where f is not anymore part of S
anymore afterwards. Then, with f ∈ F?D(v, v′), g ∈ F?I (v′),
we get
δΠRFP(v,f) =

true if v ≤ vSchl < v′,
false if vSchl < v,
false if vSchl ≥ v′,
In case of a false result, we perform ΠRFP a second time,
but with the parameters v′ and g, which yields
δΠRFP(v′,g) =
{
true if vSchl ≥ v′,
false if vSchl < v.
This may, as in the case for branch detection, be done recur-
sively. Note that there may exist f ∈ (F?B(v, v′) ∩ F?D(v, v′))
for some v′ ∈ V , representing functions that have been added
to different branches and are deprecated at the same time.
G. Security Analysis
For the security analysis of the RFP scheme RFP our goal
is to show that it is secure as described in Definition 8. In
other words, a verifier V of RFP must fulfill correctness and
soundness in respect to both ΠRSI and RFP, respectively.
Proof: We first show that RFP is a building block for
ΠRSI. Assume that V is correct and sound according to RFP.
In the SLA, both parties agreed on the target software Strg ∈
S. At the end of RFP, V outputs a candidate set C ⊂ S
with Ssrc ∈ C. Then, V can compare Strg to C and outputs
true, if it is contained therein, otherwise false. Hence, V
is correct and sound according to ΠRSI.
Now we are left to show that RFP-correctness and RFP-ε1-
soundness are given for V. Since RFP executes tests via ΠRFP
successively for different softwares S ∈ S , after some time
(depending on the strategy) a certain amount of softwares have
been tested such that Test yields a decision log ∆ which, input
into Output, results by computing upper and lower bounds of
software versions in a final candidate set C. This is due to
the upper and lower bounds reducing the cardinality of C for
each step of an efficient strategy, enclosing only Ssrc at the
end. This holds as long as the strategy reduces the cardinality
of C at any time, it must not be efficient, but it must be
possible to eventually test any software version. Next, let us
consider RFP leveraging Class 4 fingerprinting techniques,
i.e., security flaw-depending techniques (see Section II-D).
This may call a transition δ or output function ω of Schl
such that the software runs into an error state ⊥ and abruptly
halts before RFP ends. To prevent this, RFP only employs
fingerprinting techniques without transitioning RFP into ⊥,
see Section V-A. Therefore, RFP-correctness is given due to
successive tests of inherent functions of Strg on Schl based
on named fingerprinting techniques producing a successively
reduced candidate set C.
For RFP-soundness, we need to model the capabilities of
P to act malicious. Essentially, there are the following three
ways:
1) Simulating Functions: Recall that V communicates with
Schl, which the prover P uses to cover direct access to Ssrc
and to mimic Strg. To do so, he sets Schl = Produce(Ssrc) and
may simulate functions that are not part of Ssrc (but of Strg).
However, following from the Definitions 6 and 12, altering
Ssrc is only possible for functions that are not simulation-
hard. But altering or simulating such functions f 6∈ F? will not
affect ΠRFP, since it only tests for functions f ∈ F?I ∪F?B∪F?D
which are all simulation-hard. Hence, a malicious prover P can
not fool the verifier V by simulating functions.
2) Caching or Pre-Computation of Responses: After V did
audit P for a software Strg once, the P can fool the verifier
for the next audit as follows: He records all challenges and
responses and stores them in a database. Next, he sets Ssrc
and Schl to any softwares he wants. Then, if V audits P
again, e.g., in form of a regular scheduled auditing process,
P just replies with the entries from his database. Recall that
a challenge c in ΠRFP depends on the randomness source Φ
that is either chosen by V. That is, two challenges for the
same software version S ∈ S , same interface Ic ∈ I, and
same simulation-hard function f will always be different, i.e.,
c(S, φ, Ic) 6= c(S, φ′, Ic), where φ, φ′ ∈R Φ are different with
overwhelming probability. Hence, a malicious prover P can
not fool the verifier V using caching or pre-computation of
responses.
3) Proxy-Forwarding of Challenges: Assume that in addi-
tion to P there exists another prover P′ who has installed Strg,
that is the software in the version agreed on in the SLA. If
V sends a challenge c to P, he forwards c to P′, who in turn
computes the correct response e′. Latter is then sent over P
to V, who would then come to the conclusion, that P indeed
runs the correct software version. However, forwarding c and
e′ requires a certain amount of time t′. Since there is an upper
time limit t ∈ D[S] for each challenge (see Definition 9),
this value can be set conservatively, such that forwarding is
not possible anymore without being detected, i.e., taking too
much time such that ΠRFP will output δ = false. Hence, a
malicious prover P can not fool the verifier V by forwarding
challenges.
Since all malicious options for the prover P are not suc-
cessful, the verifier V fulfills soundness in respect to RFP. In
conclusion, V is correct and sound with respect to both ΠRSI
and RFP and therefore RFP is secure and also solves the
RSI-problem.
V. DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION OF RFP
In this section, we introduce three new fingerprinting tech-
niques for RFP to design challenges and expected responses.
We furthermore delve into the design of a database and strate-
gies, giving examples each. Finally, we show the advantages
of the RFP structure for implementation and employ our own
prototype to remotely audit software.
A. Secure Fingerprinting Techniques
As we have shown in Section II-D, current state of the art
fingerprinting techniques are not secure, that is they can be
fooled by a malicious provider. In Appendix D1 we give a
detailed security analysis for each class of the fingerprinting
techniques. We have used these techniques directly as part
of ΠRSI, but note that they still remain insecure when used
as part of ΠRFP. This is due to missing features such as
time constraints, randomization of challenge-response-pairs,
and relying on simulation-hard functions. Consequently, none
of these should be used to audit software.
We will now introduce three new fingerprinting techniques
which all, implemented in ΠRFP, lead to a secure scheme
RFP. Furthermore, these techniques belong to a new class
which we call Class 5: Dynamic Behavior-Depending Tech-
niques. Note that a fingerprinting technique can directly be
seen as a design instruction for challenges and according
expected responses.
1) Dynamic Request Response: The verifier requests the
software Schl to perform a certain simulation-hard function f
in a specific way with some input parameters φ. This means
that f can be nested, e.g., iterated, or that it is used as part of
a larger function or control structure. At least one of the three
components must be randomized and the response by Schl
must depend on this randomness. That is, the output space of
Γ∗ of Schl must be polynomial in the size of the randomness
space of the randomness source Φ in respect to f .
As an example, let diffDate(a,b) be a simulation-hard
function that returns the difference between two date objects
a and b, where a date object is defined as in RFC 3339 [22].
Then, the challenge sends two random date objects a and b
as challenge and checks if the response reflects the correct
implementation of the function diffDate.
2) Error Handling: In contrast to Error Code, we are not
interested in the error itself, but rather when the error occurs
and why, i.e., which circumstances lead to cause the error.
Here, the sent challenge depends on a simulation-hard function
with parameters which produces an error for a given software
version of the software family. Randomization is done as in
Dynamic Request Response, and the response consists of the
erroneous behavior of the called function. Note that Error
Handling can be realized by using Dynamic Request Response
in a certain way, hence they are in the same fingerprinting
technique class.
As an example, let diffDate be a simulation-hard func-
tion as above but that does not support the input in RFC 3339
format for a S ∈ S . Then, given a randomized input in
RFP 3339 format, the function will throw a certain error
depending on the input value which allows deducing the
software version.
3) Non-Destructive Security Exploit: This technique ex-
ploits non-destructive security vulnerabilities in a software
with randomized function parameters. If no update has been
applied, the exploit will be successful and hence leak infor-
mation about the installed software version. This deviates in
two points compared to Security Exploit: First, we only use
security vulnerabilities that are non-destructive, that is they
do not damage the system and especially do not crash the
system leading to an abrupt halt. Second, this allows for testing
multiple non-destructive security flaws in order to retrieve
information about the version number. Note that this finger-
printing technique can be realized by using Dynamic Request
Response, hence they are in the same class of fingerprinting
techniques.
As an example, an authentication check may not be per-
formed correctly, i.e., with a security flaw, hence allowing
access to otherwise protected information.
B. Database Design
A RFP database D(S, I) is defined over the software family
S and a set of interfaces I. It consists of triples (c, e, t) with
challenge c, expected response e, and time constraint t, see
Definition 9 for details. As stated in Section IV-D, designing
such a database is one of the main tasks of the verifier. The
design comprises four steps which we will now explain in
detail.
1) Finding Simulation-Hard Functions: The first goal is to
find at least one simulation-hard function f ∈ F?(S) for each
S ∈ S and a given set of interfaces I ⊆ I∗. Usually, the
interfaces are known a priori to designing the database, that
is how a user connects to the software or service. Therefore,
we will focus on finding suitable functions.
Following from Section IV-F, determining software versions
comes down to requiring intrinsic functions to distinguish
between them, i.e., by relying on tests via ΠRFP employing
functions out of F?I , F?B, and F?D. Note that F?B and F?D will
eventually also require intrinsic functions of F?I . Hence, we
will need simulation-hard intrinsic functions for each software
version as basis for a RFP database, which also need to be
able to be randomized in some way, e.g., by parametrization
or structure. To find these functions, a good place to start is to
research the version history or release notes of S, that is the list
of individual changes from one version to the next or previous
one. They are often provided by the software developers,
e.g., PHP changelog [23], but can also be extracted from
repositories such as GitHub [24]. Additionally, compatibility
changes also help finding intrinsic functions, e.g., Firefox site
compatibility [25]. If S is closed source, i.e., the current
software code and/or version history are not available, the
verifier can try to build a version history by himself by
analyzing other sources such as news and developer blogs for
S. At the end, the verifier might stick to the fingerprinting
technique Non-Destructive Security Exploit based on known,
e.g., leaked, security exploits.
By comparing the properties, functions, and behavior of dis-
tinct (especially consecutive) releases of the software versions,
the verifier selects those functions which are only available
up until a certain software version and are no longer available
(deprecated functions), or which are beginning to be part of the
software starting at a certain software version (new intrinsic
functions). In addition to removed or new functions, one may
also choose altered functions which then also posses new
intrinsic properties. Recall that different interfaces allow for
different functions being accessed, increasing or decreasing
possibly the set of available functions to gather for a database.
At the end, we have a set of simulation-hard functions F?I (S)
for each S ∈ S , or, if due to software hierarchies there
is no such function for S, the sets F?B(S) and F?I (S) will
complement the respective entry in the database. If, however,
(i) there is no function available for a certain S, a test later
on via ΠRFP will not return false, since the provider did
not fail at the test, since for RFP it holds S ≡ S′ for some
other software version S′. And (ii) we can not determine if S
is not running, i.e., we set δΠRFP(S) = true if F?I (S) = ∅
(and F?B(S),F?D(S) are also empty).
2) Computing Challenges and Expected Responses: Based
on the functions of the set F?I (S), which have been gathered
in the previous step, we compute the triple (c, e, t)S for each
S ∈ S . As mentioned in Section IV-C, a challenge also
depends on a randomness source Φ. The verifier selects Φ
to be a cryptographic secure random number generator, that
is it is sufficiently difficult do guess the next output based
on previous outputs. He includes Φ in the design of the
challenge c to randomize the parameters or structure of f ,
or both, later on. The challenge itself is stored in the database
with placeholders for the randomness φ ∈ Φ. They are being
replaced dynamically as part of ΠRFP just before sending the
challenge to P. Obviously, the details depend heavily on f
itself. In general, the goal is to let the provider do some
randomized work over f which can only be solved in the given
time frame if f is implemented and working as intended.
Next, the verifier simulates a perfect software provider
which runs a software with version S. This allows him to
compute the expected response e by processing the previously
computed c and storing the output. The randomness φ is
input as placeholders which are evaluated when the reply
of the provider arrives. Here, the verifier must ensure that
possible influences by the interface channel, such as data
encoding, are incorporated. The verifier also measures the time
required to compute e and adds a certain estimated threshold
to respect network latency yielding the maximal allowed time
t to process the challenge c. Finally, the verifier stores all
tuples in the database D(S, I).
3) Overcoming Software Version Hierarchy: We will now
explain how software development and version hierarchies in-
fluence the database design. Recall that two different versions
of the same software, i.e., vS < vS′ with S, S′ ∈ S, might have
a very similar latest version history. That is, they differ from
their respective preceding version by nearly the same changes
which makes it difficult to distinguish between them a priori.
As explained in Section IV-F, this occurs on different software
branches that are maintained at the same time. Howeever,
there will be features which have been added to a predecessor
of S, i.e., in the branch of S, but are not available in S′,
since it exists on a different branch. Additionally, functions
may only exist in the versions between S and S′, but not
before or afterwards. These deprecated functions can not
give any information about software that has a lower version
number than S and a higher version number than S′. We will
now explain how the verifier copes with these entries in the
database and how he finds related branching and deprecated
versions.
Coming from the previous step of computing challenges and
expected responses, we now have at least one tuple (c, e, t)S
for each S ∈ S in our database D. To respect and overcome
the software properties and version hierarchies mentioned
above, we will add additional tests for branch origins and
deprecated functions to existing tests if required. In other
words, there can be more than one test for a software version
S ∈ S.
Regarding branch detection, this follows from the version
history of S and results in testing for a function of F?B. That
is, if two different software versions S and S′ each have
the same change log in respect to their previous version, the
verifier determines the next lower branch origin Ŝ of the higher
version, wlog. S′. Since we already added a test for this certain
software version Ŝ to D in the previous step (recall that this
was done for all softwares of S), we can simply add this test
to the test of S′. As an example, let D[S] denote the test for
S stored in a database D. Then, if the changes between (i)
1.2.2 and vS = 1.2.3 and (ii) 3.4.4 and vS′ = 3.4.5 are equal
with respect to distinguishing sequences for simulation-hard
functions, then the test entry in D is D[S] = D[1.2.3] for S,
while for S′ it is D[S′] = D[3.4.0] ∧ D[1.2.3] =: D[Ŝ, S].
Hence, RFP learns δ for either only one or two tests and
can act accordingly, e.g., supported by a strategy. The verifier
always wants to detect the branch origin before performing
other tests, since if this test is not successful, he knows that
he can jump immediately to an other branch. Concatenating
tests is not commutative and will be halted as soon as one
δ = false is output by a single test. To find v′ = vS′
as given in equation (5), the verifier compares S′ to each
branch that has been active during the release time of S′.
As a final note, a combination of tests as D[S] = D[S′, sw′′]
can also contain further tests, even for S itself (which then
is not a circular reference since only S-related tests have to
be executed). This is required if multiple consecutive releases
on different branches have the same feature difference to its
predecessor each.
For deprecated functions, we analogously get a function in
F?D for S, and add a second test to determine the version range
in which the function is available. That is, we later want to
perform a second test after testing the specific intrinsic func-
tion of S to determine its version including the information of
deprecated functions. This way, we know if some f ∈ F?I (S)
is available via D[S], and can afterwards execute the second
check D[S′] for a function f ′ ∈ F?D(vS , vS′). This yields
D[S] = D[S, f ] ∧ D[S′, f ′]. To find v′ = vS′ as given in
equation (6), the verifier compares the functionality f of S to
all adjacent versions to find the version range of f .
Please observe that executing the tests in a given order is
possible since the verifier knows during the creation of the
database if f ∈ F?B or f ∈ F?D for a functionality f of
S. Note that this is not an exclusive or. If there are two
different software versions S and S′ with the same set of
simulation-hard intrinsic functions, same branch origin and
no deprecated function, i.e. F?I , F?B, and F?D are the same
for both S and S′, we then have S ≡ S′, that is both versions
are indistinguishable.
From a practical point of view, the referred tests must not be
stored multiple times in the database, for example, a references
should point to the entry of that version in the database.
Additionally, the verifier should make sure that each test is
only performed once, e.g., by employing ∆. Another important
point in practice is that some tests require using features of a
software that might not be implemented in the current running
version of Schl yet. That is, if the verifier is testing for some
functionality of, e.g., software version 2, but actually the CSP
hosts Schl with software version 1, then it might be that Schl
is technically not capable of understanding a challenge for
software version 2. Then, the Schl will most likely throw an
error (which is not a fingerprinting technique since this holds
for all versions greater 1). In this case, software version 1
would be a predecessor that has to be tested before software
version 2 is tested. In other words, software version 1 must be
treated as a branch origin of software version 2, i.e., pointing
via referer to the according database entry. As an example,
testing for PHP version 7.1.20 only makes technically sense
if there was beforehand a test for version 7.0.0. That is, RFP
tests 7.0.0 and only if this test succeeds, the test for 7.1.20 is
performed, i.e., D[7.1.20] = D[7.0.0, 7.1.20] (note that this is
not a circular reference: the latter test refers to the intrinsic
functions of 7.1.20 only).
4) Strategy Independence: Following from the previous
steps, we now have a database which consists of entries either
with a single test for software versions that can be identified
by an intrinsic simulation-hard function only, or with multiple
tests if the software version shares common intrinsic functions
with a software version from another branch or its intrinsic
function is only available for a certain range of software
versions.
In this final database design step, the verifier makes sure that
the database D will later on work with any strategy θ ∈ Θ, i.e.,
D is independent of any reasonable θ. Ultimately, we do not
want to restrict the set of possible strategies, i.e., be as flexible
as possible. The reason is that different strategies require
a different number of steps to determine the final software
version. This depends on the software that is being audited
and the start software version of the strategy. For the database
design it is important that any order of software version tests is
applicable. For example, when a starting with a test for version
5.3.2 it is not sufficient to check for the intrinsic functions of
this specific version. By applying the respective tests referred
to in the database, the verifier also needs to check that the
software is part of 5.3, and again as part of this he needs to
make sure that the major branch 5 is indeed correct. Otherwise,
it is possible that a test erroneously yields a correct output,
for example when branching is involved. Therefore, the verifier
has to make sure that any entry point of a strategy leads to the
correct result (given the strategy is reasonable). Furthermore,
software may change and branches as well as new versions will
be added, requiring to alter existing entries in the database.
Note that if the branch origin tests and deprecated function
tests are included correctly in the database for each software
version test, no matter where RFP starts in the database, there
will always be a reference to one or more tests, yielding unique
results. Hence, correctness is given for any reasonable strategy.
In conclusion, the main challenges for the verifier regard-
ing creating a database are evaluating the version history,
implementing probabilistic properties into intrinsic functions,
reference versions in case of branching, deprecated functions,
or technical dependencies, and to make the database sound
such that any strategy can run on it. On top, the database
should be updated whenever there is a software version S
added to S, to allow distinguishing S from other software
versions. We refer the reader to Section V-E1 for a brief
explanation of the database format in practice and the general
capabilities of our database implementation with example code
included.
C. Strategy Design
A strategy θ ∈ Θ, as defined in Definition 11, is constructed
by the verifier and consists of two parts: first, a start entry
of a database D(S, I), and second, how to select the next
entry in the database based on previous tests and results stored
in ∆. On top, a strategy may repeat tests, even the whole
strategy itself overall. This is required, since anomalies in
the network between the verifier and tested software can be
mitigated by performing time- and function-critical processes
multiple times. For example, a strategy could execute itself
after completion of one run in order to test if the CSP behaves
differently regarding latency or computation results.
In order to find a good strategy, we need to recall the
three characteristic cases of software version hierarchy from
before: intrinsic simulation-hard functions, version branching,
and deprecated functions. For example, two different versions
may share the same intrinsic functions but are part of different
branches. Depending on the outcome of the individual tests,
different actions need to follow. As an example, assume the
verifier tests Schl running at the CSP, and he tests against the
PHP version S with vS = 7.1.1. In the database we have
D[S] = D[7.1.0] ∧D[7.0.15] which gives the following four
cases for a strategy: (i) δΠRFP(7.1.0) = true∧δΠRFP(7.0.15) =
true ⇒ vSchl ≥ 7.1.1; (ii) δΠRFP(7.1.0) = false ∧
δΠRFP(7.0.15) = true ⇒ vSchl ≥ 7.0.15; (iii) δΠRFP(7.1.0) =
true ∧ δΠRFP(7.0.15) = false ⇒ vSchl = 7.1.0; and (iv)
δΠRFP(7.1.0) = false ∧ δΠRFP(7.0.15) = false ⇒ vSchl <
Sv ∨ vSchl < S′v . In each case, the strategy has to decide
what to do next, i.e., choose the following software version
to be tested. Hence, the verifier has to keep in mind that
combinations of tests will yield certain knowledge about the
software version running at the cloud service provider. This
is similar to the linked tests for branching and deprecated
functions. However, in this case the verifier needs to know
which version is newer than another one in order to process.
He gains this information from the database, i.e., the version
history of S, despite not having a well-defined order supported
by the version numbers.
In our reference implementation of RFP, we implemented
the following strategies which work very well for various use
cases and at the same time demonstrate the capabilities and
possibilities:
Binary Search (BS)
Classical binary search (see e.g. [26]) is based on
the idea to, first, split a set of ordered items in half
and, second, to choose the ‘correct’ half, i.e., the
half where Ssrc is included. As already mentioned,
there is no trivial way to order the software versions,
but due to the structure built beforehand, we know
if we are in the correct branch or not after a certain
test via ΠRFP, no matter how we sort all software
versions. Hence, we implemented the ordering over
the version numbers, but kept the database structure
to possibly jump in a half which was not chosen by
the original binary search algorithm (another choice
could be to sort by software version release date). In
general, this algorithm is quite efficient in finding the
correct software version. However, if due to software
branches an older version number fails a test while a
newer one succeeds (e.g., 7.1.0 is fine, while 7.0.15 is
not), the binary search algorithm will take a software
version that is older than the failed and newrer than
the succeeded version – in this case, this yields a non-
existent version and has to be treated accordingly.
Cascading Binary Search (CBS)
For this strategy, we perform binary search three
times: on the level of Major, Minor, and Patch
each in this order. Depending on the number of
different versions and branches, this reveals the target
software version quicker than classical binary search.
High To Low (HTL)
If the verifier suspects that Ssrc at the CSP is running
in a relatively recently released version of the highest
version branch, then he might employ this strategy.
The first version to test is the highest released
version, the next one the second highest released
one, and so on. This is done successively down-
wards until the correct software version has been
found, i.e., ΠRFP yielded true for some S ∈ S.
However, note that a single software version test can
reveal more information than just about the currently
tested software. Due to the referred software versions
via branching, deprecated functions, and technical
dependencies, this strategy can skip a test, since it
always selects for the next test the lowest version
which has not yet been successfully tested. This
optimistic strategy is less efficient, if the software
version tested is one that was not recently published.
Note that there are important details to be aware of:
In the example of PHP, we have δΠRFP(7.2.9) =
true ⇔ δΠRFP(7.1.21, 7.2.0) = true. Now
assume that δΠRFP(7.2.9) = false. Then, this
strategy must not select 7.1.20 as a next version
to test if δΠRFP(7.1.21) = false, but it has to
check version 7.2.8. However, if δΠRFP(7.1.21) =
false and δΠRFP(7.2.0) = false, then in fact
ΠRFP(7.1.20) must be the next test.
Low To High (LTH)
This strategy works analogously to High To Low, but
starts from the oldest (e.g., lowest when ordered by
version number) software version of S ever released.
Highest Major Step Up (HMSU)
The entry point in the database for this strategy is
the software version with the highest Major, but
lowest Minor and Patch values each. The strategy
is optimistic in the sense that it jumps directly to the
next higher Minor branch, if a test was successful.
However, if a test was not successful, it will test
the next higher Patch value. If both the test for
Minor and Patch fail, a lower Major will be
tested. This, of course, also holds, if the very first
test fails. HMSU is well suited for software families
which have a low amount of different Major values
and when the CSP is not running the most recent
version at the same time.
In conclusion, strategies define how the software versions in
a database are traversed. The implemented strategies demon-
strate just a small part of the bandwidth possible for the verifier
to create a strategy. We will compare the listed strategies to
each other in Section V-E, when testing a real-world scenario
as part of the experiments, and give a thorough description of
a single strategy (CBS). However, analyzing the runtime of
the strategies, e.g., average and worst case, is out of scope of
this paper.
D. Implementation Modularity of the RFP Framework
The structure and design of the RFP scheme RFP allows to
have a modular implementation framework. That is, RFP con-
sists of various components, such as databases and strategies,
which encapsulate different tasks. In fact, the different building
blocks of RFP interact with each other, but are independent
developed components. This yields the following modules:
1) Databases D, where a single database includes the pairs
of challenges c and expected responses e together with
a time limit t for each software S ∈ S (and possibly
referrers to other entries, see Section IV-F). Fingerprint-
ing techniques, which describe how to evaluate a certain
functionality of S, can be developed independently of
all other components, however, they are implemented as
part of a database entry.
2) Interfaces I, which represent communication channels
and can be freely chosen for each challenge and each
(expected) response. An interface may take as input
authentication data negotiated with the software provider
P.
3) Strategies Θ, dictating how to choose the next software
version S ∈ S to be audited as part of ΠRFP, depending
on earlier test results ∆.
4) A randomness source Φ, which is applied during runtime
yielding an auxiliary input to each challenge.
This flexibility results in a very adaptive nature of RFP. The
verifier is independent of the software family and software
complexity (e.g., a forum runs on PHP, which runs on Apache,
which runs on Ubuntu, etc.). Furthermore, due to the modu-
larization, the verifier can construct databases independently
of the software provider, as authentication data can be input
as a parameter. Strategies are not only independent of the
software family, but also of the database; latter may be an input
parameter. Consequently, a RFP scheme is quickly extensible
and a verifier can outsource the design of databases and
strategies, exchange them efficiently for each software family
if required and may even share them with further parties.
Finally, note that RFP is not bound to any infrastructure or
programming language, as long as it can be executed.
E. Experiments
After having defined RFP and its scheme RFP we want
to test it in a real-world setting. Hence, we performed ex-
periments with actual service providers and will also come
back to the attack example of Section II-E. According to
the database and strategy design explained above, we created
multiple databases and strategies. The databases include tests
for each software family PHP, MySQL, and WordPress, while
the strategies are the ones mentioned in Section V-C and can
be applied to any of the databases.
1) Experiment Database: For storing the databases, we
used the lightweight data-interchange format JavaScript Object
Notation (JSON, [27]), consisting in general of key-value
pairs and ordered lists. A database is created by first fetching
all available software version names from the developer of
the software family. Next, some metadata is set, such as
the timestamp for creation and last change (this info makes
updating the database easier later on), the name of the software
family, e.g., PHP, default values for software specific values,
e.g., challenge and expected response appending start- and
endstrings or default latency, default randomized variable type
and format, and which interfaces should be applied by default,
i.e., if none are specified for a specific test. See Appendix I for
an example configuration. Next, the tests for each version of
the software family is added according to the database design
presented in Section V-B. Each software version may consist
of a set of intrinsic function tests, a set of branching version
references (including technical dependencies as explained in
Section V-B3), and a test for deprecated functions.
As an example, the test for PHP 7.2.12 can be given as
seen in Listing 1. Hence, to check if at least PHP 7.2.12 is
running as the provided software, versions 7.2.0 and 7.1.24
are tested, since 7.2.12 and 7.1.24 share the same intrinsic
functions compared to their previous versions each, and 7.2.12
lives on branch 7.2.
Listing 1. RFP example database test entry for PHP 7.2.12.
1 ” 7 . 2 . 1 2 ” : {
2 ” t e s t ” : {
3 ” b r a n c h i n g ” : {
4 ” 7 . 2 . 0 ” : ” 1 ” ,
5 ” 7 . 1 . 2 4 ” : ” 1 ”
6 }
7 }
8 }
We will now give an example for a test based on an intrinsic
function. Assume that we send challenges via FTP (i.e., storing
a file) and receive responses over HTTP (access an URL
whose content is provided by PHP and a webserver). Then,
the test for PHP 7.2.0 may be given as in Listing 2. First, a
variable ax is defined as a random integer3 between 1 and
999999999. Next, the challenge payload calls the function
unserialize, which unserializes the randomized string
d:#ax#e++2, which has, by intention, not the correct format
for a serialized float number. For example, d:3e+2 represents
3 · 102 = 300. Before PHP 7.2.0, the software replies with
float(3) in the given example, which is not compliant
to the definition and hence wrong. With the introduction of
PHP 7.2.0, the response for such a string consists correctly
solely of a (variable) error message. With this knowledge,
we can test if the payload returns false, denoting that at
least PHP 7.2.0 is running.4 We use the function var_dump
to transform the output of any argument into a string. The
expected payload contains the value that we are expected
to get as a response from the CSP. Note that we are using
the fingerprinting technique Error Handling with the intrinsic
simulation-hard function unserialize to determine if at
least version 7.2.0 is running here. Also, recall that due to
the randomization and time-constrain, the software provider
can not pre-compute, cache, or forward the challenge and
has, in particular, to execute the challenge in the actual target
environment.
Listing 2. RFP example database test entry for PHP 7.2.0.
1 ” 7 . 2 . 0 ” : {
2 ” t e s t ” : {
3 ” v a r i a b l e s ” : {
4 ” ax ” : {
5 ” f o r m a t ” : ” i n t e g e r ” ,
3We implemented also randomized formats such as strings, binary values,
version information, or directories and files.
4For this example we disabled error reporting, hence the output consist
only of the boolean value false.
6 ” min ” : 1 ,
7 ”max” : 999999999
8 }
9 } ,
10 ” c h a l l e n g e ” : {
11 ” p a y l o a d ” :
12 ” var dump ( @ u n s e r i a l i z e ( ’ d : # ax # e + + 2 ; ’ ) ) ; ”
13 } ,
14 ” e x p e c t ” : {
15 ” p a y l o a d ” : ” boo l ( f a l s e )\ n ”
16 }
17 }
18 }
Note that, in comparison to RFP, the often used fingerprinting
techniques of Class 1 merely query a version API, e.g.,
phpversion() in the case of PHP, SELECT VERSION()
for most SQL databases, or a banner for command-line soft-
ware. Recall that the response can then be freely chosen by
the (malicious) service provider.
2) Defying the Practical Attack: We implemented the RFP
scheme in PHP, allowing us to port it quickly to any other
system. Of course, any high-level programming language will
also work perfectly fine. Recall the practical attack on finger-
printing techniques from Section II-E: we set up a malicious
server that is running PHP 7.1.1, but on challenging any
version function, the server replies with 20.0.85-car. The
tested version scanners were convinced that this non-existent
software version is indeed running.
We will now leverage RFP to determine the software version
of this malicious server and compare the outcome to other
tools. For easier use, we implemented an RFP-Wizard, which
is part of RFP and can cover technical details such as the
authentication and network setup as well as location of the
database and service provider. The wizard is also available as
API, e.g., via REST. To begin, we first specify the database D
with software family S = PHP (378 versions, lowest is 4.0b1,
and highest is 7.3.0rc5) and interfaces I = {FTP,HTTP},
and next the credentials for the challenges sent via FTP
and responses received over HTTP. Finally, we provide RFP
with an a priori customer target version claim, for example
version 7.3.0. In fact, this is the information the customer
of the service provider usually gets from their customer web
interface. In other words, this is the advertised or in an SLA
agreed on software version the provider has promised to run.
As mentioned in Section IV-A, we now have a RSI protocol
ΠRSI with RFP as a building block. We perform RFP with
the strategies Cascading Binary Search and Highest Major
Step Up to compare both. The test procedure results are
given in Table I, where “Version” denotes the PHP version
tested, “Result” is the outcome of the test – either true
(3) or false (7) –, and “Testorder” is the sequence in
which the tests have been performed, i.e., the distinguishing
sequence. While the strategies traverse different paths through
the possible software versions, both determine correctly 7.1.1
as the software version running at the service provider. Hence,
RFP overcomes the problems of existing tools and can detect
software versions even in the presence of a malicious service
provider. More formally, RFP yields vSsrc = vMsrc = 7.1.1,
Cascading Binary Search Highest Major Step Up
Version Result Testorder Version Result Testorder
5.0.0b1 3 1 7.0.0 7 1
7.0.0 3 2 7.1.0 3 2
7.2.0 7 3 7.2.0 7 3
7.1.0 3 4 7.0.15 3 4
7.0.26 7 5 7.1.1 3 5
7.0.22 7 6 7.1.2 7 6
7.1.2 7 7
7.0.15 3 8
7.1.1 3 9
TABLE I
RFP TEST PROCEDURE RESULTS OF A MALICIOUS PHP SERVICE
PROVIDER WITH THE FAKED SOFTWARE VERSION NUMBER
20.9.85-CAR . RFP DETERMINES THE CORRECT VERSION 7.1.1,
EMPLOYING THE STRATEGIES CBS AND HMSU EACH FOR COMPARISON.
vSchl = vMchl = 20.9.85-car, and vStrg = vMtrg = 7.3.0, while
other tools yield erroneously vMsrc = vMchl . To complete an
RSI, the verifier has to check if the CSP is compliant to the
SLA, i.e., if it holds that Ssrc = Strg (which is not the case
here).
3) Evaluating Real-World Software Providers: We tested
various software providers regarding their promises of the
running software version using RFP, e.g., Hetzner [28], Server-
profis [29], or Strato [30]. As a result, while no provider was
really wrong, some of them promised to have “the newest
version” installed, but did not provide a Patch value of the
version number running in the customer web interface. This
may be due to save content update time, since this reduces
the text changes the providers have to make each time a new
version is being released. However, at each point in time, the
most recent version for a given Major and Minor branch
is always clearly defined at the tested providers. We found
that all but one of the providers indeed hat the most recent
version installed. The other was between a single up to five
Patch versions behind. In contrast, for MySQL, no version
number was provided in the customer web interface, but it got
advertised by the Major version, leaving open both Minor
and Patch versions. Not updating to the newest version will
result in less secure software (except some edge cases). Hence,
it is crucial to keep software up to date.
We will now use RFP to determine the most recent version
of PHP 7.2 running at the platform as a service provider
‘Serverprofis’. In order to demonstrate how different strategies
analyze the same software, we are performing this procedure
for each strategy mentioned in Section V-C, except Low To
High. The result is presented in Table II, where “R.” is short
for “Result”, and the tests are listed in the order they have
been performed. At the end, RFP proves that indeed the most
current version of PHP 7.2 is running at the moment of testing,
i.e., 7.2.14.
Finally, we want to explain in detail one strategy, such that
the reader knows why the versions have been tested in the
order presented in Table II. Hence, we will briefly describe
Cascading Binary Search (CBS). The first goal of this strategy
is to determine the correct Major version. The database
contains 4, 5, and 7 as candidates, and CBS starts in the middle
BS CBS HTL HMSU
Version R. Version R. Version R. Version R.
5.2.0 3 5.0.0b1 3 7.3.0rc4 7 7.0.0 3
7.1.0 3 7.0.0 3 7.2.14 3 7.1.0 3
7.0.15 3 7.2.0 3 7.2.0 3
7.1.1 3 7.3.0rc4 7 7.3.0rc4 7
7.1.21 3 7.1.21 3 7.1.13 3
7.2.0 3 7.2.9 3 7.2.1 3
7.0.0 3 7.2.14 3 7.1.14 3
7.1.20 3 7.2.2 3
7.2.8 3 7.1.20 3
7.2.14 3 7.2.8 3
7.3.0rc4 7 7.1.21 3
7.2.9 3
7.2.11 3
7.2.14 3
TABLE II
RFP PROVES THAT THE SOFTWARE PROVIDER ‘SERVERPROFIS’ HAS
INDEED RUNNING THE LATEST VERSION OF PHP 7.2 AT A CERTAIN POINT
IN TIME. THE TABLE SHOWS A COMPARISON OF FOUR DIFFERENT
STRATEGIES EMPLOYED IN THIS RFP TEST: BS, CBS, HTL, AND HMSU.
with Major version 5 and the lowest available version thereof,
i.e., 5.0.0b1. In this case, we get true as a result, hence, the
tested software might have with a higher Major version and
we test for version 7, i.e., 7.0.0, which results in true, too.
Next, we want to find the correct Minor version. For PHP
7, we have the following Minor versions in the database: 0,
1, 2, and 3. Choosing again the (optimistic, i.e., rounding up)
middle, the test ΠRFP(7.2.0) results in true. Note that we
do not have to check 7.0.0 again. Next, however, testing for
Minor version 3 fails. We now are looking for the final part,
determining Patch out of the possible values in our database,
i.e., 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, and 14. We want to show here that without a
perfectly filled database, RFP still manages to find the correct
version, as long as it is included. Observe that Patch value 0
was already tested. The last two steps are successfully testing
for Patch version 9 and 14. Since there is no version of PHP
between 7.2.14 and 7.3.x, we do not need to conduct further
tests and CBS can output the final, correct software version
as result: 7.2.14.
VI. EXTENSIONS OF RFP
In this section we describe two extensions of RFP: fin-
gerprinting hardware and outsourcing the burden of creating
databases and strategies of the verifier to an external auditor.
While a software provider simply might act as a verifier in
the RFP scheme RFP in order to audit himself, this is not an
extension of RFP.
A. Fingerprinting SD Cards
Until now, we presented RFP as a method to determine
the identity of software, i.e., the software’s correct version.
However, the same concept behind the RFP scheme can also
be applied to verify the correctness of hardware features.
One case is the overall available storage on an SD card
(Secure Digital Memory Card [31]). The maximum storage
available is effectively just represented by a string of charac-
ters which is then consumed by other applications. Usually,
this string is not checked by any operating systems and is
“believed” to be correct as it is stored on a certain, in general
non-accessible part of the card. This scenario is very similar to
software, whose version number string is also being “believed”
to be correct without any checks.
The idea is now to extend RFP by testing for available
space on the SD card until we find the maximum amount
possible (or at least a close range thereof). To do so, we
set the RFP database to not contain version numbers, but
various magnitudes of storage sizes, e.g., 1 kilo byte (kB),
10kB, 100kB, and so on. For each challenge, the precise value
of the storage size is chosen randomly (in the range of the
chosen magnitude), as well as the content. Then, the data is
transmitted to the previously erased SD card over an interface
provided by the operating system or network. As in original
RFP, various strategies may be applied, e.g., binary search
(which is easy here, since a clear order on the target space
exists – storage space). At some point in time, the SD card
will stop taking data because it is full. Then, the verifier has
learned the maximum capacity of the SD card.
This extension of RFP is especially of interest, since there
are many SD cards which claim to have a higher storage
capacity than they really possess. The motivation behind such
products are manufacturers who buy cheap low-storage SD
cards and replace only the string with the available space value
in it. This, is quite easy given a certain interface, and allows
selling cards of a Terabyte which identify as such, but can only
store a few Gigabyte. The customer most often will only notice
this fact when it’s too late. We want to point out that there
exists software, that determines the size of a storage object
reliably in different ways, if used correctly (e.g., formatting
software), RFP complements these tools.
B. Outsourced RFP
We have presented RFP as a two-party protocol between
a verifier V and a (cloud) software provider P. As we have
seen in Sections V-B and V-C, the verifier has to construct
a database for each software family S, employ randomness,
and implement strategies to perform RFP. However, a usual
customer of the provider may not have the required resources,
i.e., time, money, computing, or storage power. Hence, we
introduce a third party to take away the burden of the customer:
the auditor A. The goal of the auditor is to check on behalf
of the customer if the provider behaves correctly, and in the
case that something is not working as intended, i.e., as defined
in according SLA, he informs the customer. In practice,
however, the provider may detect based on the interface if
a RFP challenge comes from a customer or from A, and
act differently. That is, P will use a certain server instance
to reply to challenges of A, where this server has installed
the most recent software version of S. Note that this is not
proxy forwarding since this server can co-exist directly beside
(virtual or non-virtual) the server the customer is using. In
other words, A can not check P directly or independently of
the customer. Observe that this is different for functionality
than, e.g., storage. However, the auditor can nonetheless take
Fig. 3. Sketch of the ORFP scheme consisting of the customer, auditor, and
(cloud) service provider. Each party generates values and stores signed values
of all signed in- and outputs in a respective log file.
care of the expensive parts of RFP, i.e., building database and
strategy.
We are now going to extend RFP by adding the auditor
party A and new security definitions and measures to RFP. We
dub this scheme Outsourced RFP (ORFP), since the customer
outsources above mentioned tasks to the auditor. This is similar
to the ideas of Outsourced Proofs of Retrievability [32], where
proofs of retrievability are outsourced to an auditor to verify
outsourced data availability. Since three parties participate
in an ORFP, more than one party may be malicious, and,
additionally, two parties may collude to cheat the third one.
Hence, each party must be able to prove that it did its job
correctly at any given moment in time. That is, a customer
must be able to audit the auditor to check if he did stick to
the protocol while at the same time the auditor must be able to
prove that he did everything correctly, i.e., prove his liability.
The core idea of ORFP is twofold: (i) the auditor generates
the database and strategies for a software family (or multiple
thereof) while the customer inputs the randomness into the
challenge and sends it to the service provider; and (ii) each
party keeps a log of all input and output values together with
their respective timestamps signed by the generating party. The
first point shifts the main burden of RFP from the customer
to the auditor, while the second point allows to protect against
malicious parties and to prove liability. The ORFP scheme is
depicted in Figure 3.
1) ORFP Scheme Description: The ORFP scheme begins
with a setup phase which corresponds to the procedure Setup
of RFP, where private and public keys are generated and
distributed for each party. Then, the customer/user U sends
a interface set I to the auditor A together with the software
family S. Here, I is chosen such that the auditor does not
learn the credentials of the user but latter will use it to
send and receive data from the service provider P, e.g., FTP
and HTTP. The user may also send a software version vStrg
representing the software version the provider should have
running, otherwise the auditor can set vStrg to the latest version
of S. Furthermore, U initializes a randomness source Φ. In the
final part of the setup phase the auditor computes the database
D(S, I), strategies Θ, and each party creates a respective log
file ΛU, ΛA, or ΛP.
Next, the audit phase extends the RFP procedure Test,
where A begins by choosing a strategy θ ∈ Θ which is used
for the whole phase. Next, A selects a challenge c from the
database D according to θ and sends it to U together with a
signature S1 := SignA(c, t1) where t1 is the current time.
Please observe that we omit the private key inputs of the
signature here. Then, U induces randomness φ ∈ Φ into the
challenge producing an altered challenge c′. He also computes
the signature S2 := SignU(φ, t2, S1) and sends it together
with c′ to P. The P then performs the computation of c′
resulting in the response e′, determines t3, and computes the
signature S3 := signaturePe′, t3, S2. He adds to his log
ΛP the values (c′, e′, t3, S2, S3). Next, the client fetches e′,
t3, and S3, computes S4 := SignU(t4) based on the current
time t4, and forwards these values together with φ, t2, and
S2 to A. He furthermore adds to his log ΛU the values
(c, φ, e′, t2, t3, t4, S2, S3, S4). In the last step, A validates e′
dependent on both c and φ, and then decides to either start a
next test (according to the protocol ΠRFP and strategy θ) or,
when no further tests shall be done, he outputs a candidate set
C via the procedure Output. If vS 6∈ C, the auditor informs
U. The auditor also updates his log ΛA by adding the entry
(c, φ, e′, t1, t2, t3, t4, S1, S2, S3, S4).
2) ORFP Security Outline: The properties correctness and
soundness of ORFP follow from ΠRFP-correctness and ΠRFP-
soundness, since ORFP basically incorporates the RFP scheme
RFP. For example, this can be seen by grouping A and U as
the party verifier.
We begin by showing that U must draw φ ∈R Φ. An
ORFP scheme employs randomness, as RFP, to prevent pre-
computation or caching of the correct response by P. Hence,
the value φ must be drawn by U or A. First, let’s suppose A
chooses the randomness value. He might collude with P and
communicate with him the expected response such that P does
not need to have any software installed at all. In comparison to
OPOR, once deleted data can not be un-deleted and the answer
depends on user chosen values, however, certain functionality
can be cheated any time here and P has no data depending on
U in RFP. If A colludes with U to fool P, they can challenge
for some randomness value and afterwards pretend that they
have asked for a different randomness value. However, since
the CSP stores the challenge in his audit log ΛP, he can
provably show which challenge was actually sent to him.
Overall, neither P nor A can securely input the randomness
value into ORFP. Next, we investigate the user U selecting the
randomness value. If he colludes with P, they do not have the
correct response to send to A since U may choose the same
randomness each time such that pre-computation or caching
might be possible. However, they need to send this value to
A such that he can compute the correct expected response.
However, if U sends each time the same value to A, he will
be alarmed. At the end, they are not able to fool A, since he
can compute the expected response correctly based on his log
ΛA and hence show that he did his job correctly. On the other
hand, if U colludes with A, again the audit log ΛP allows P
to show that he acted according to the protocol. In conclusion,
the user U draws the value φ from Φ.
The randomness source Φ itself must not be a public
external randomness source (as in OPOR), since A has also
access to this source and could pre-compute the randomness
values to share the expected responses with P, fooling U.
However, U might employ any (pseudo-)randomness only
known to him or he involves a private key in determining
the randomness value.
We will now outline the third component of ORFP security:
liability of each party. That is, a party can prove that it behaved
correctly according to the ORFP protocol. Furthermore, other
parties need to be able to verify this, e.g., the user must be able
to audit the auditor. The reader is referred to OPOR, where
thorough definition and security analysis of liability is given.
However, the scheme implementation is different to ORFP.
First, assume the auditor A wants to prove his liability.
He can do so due to the audit log ΛA, which consists of
all values of previous ORFP runs that are required for the
auditor to compute his output. Since each value is signed by
the generating party, the auditor can prove that he did his
job correctly. Given the case that the auditor has not correctly
generated the challenges and expected responses as part of the
database, the user U can verify this by comparing the inputs
and outputs of ΛA and ΛU. By performing RFP onto the data
of the logs, U must come to the same output as A, otherwise
liability is not given.
The same procedure can be applied for any liability proof of
a party, since each party holds an audit file with values signed
by the other parties. Note that this is applicable in both ways:
a party can show that it has done everything correctly and
that another party can verify this. In other words, if a version
claim does not succeed, the user can check if the mistake
was by the service provider (wrong response) or the auditor
(wrong challenge/expected response). Also, each party signs
the values sent to the succeeding party in order to manifest
that these values were generated correctly, i.e., they may be
tested against a neutral server.
For future research the auditor may fetch the response of
the service provider directly. Here, the main challenge is that
the customer and auditor must have synchronized clocks for
precise time measurement.
VII. RELATED WORK
In the following, we name for different scenarios respective
approaches the most prominent related work and explain
the relation to Reverse Fingerprinting. We do not include
discovery scanner who try to determine all running services
on a system. In Table III, Appendix I, we give an overview at
a glance of different tools and their employed fingerprinting
techniques. Many of the tools presented advertise two different
modes of fingerprinting techniques: normal and aggressive.
Usually, normal translates to Version Claim or Version API
and aggressive to a second guess by using another technique,
often File Structure/Content. None of the analyzed tools is
using a strategy to detect a version number as RFP does.
Except of one, all tools rely on trusting fixed strings received
from the tested software. Depending on the task of the tool,
fingerprinting is only one step in a chain of actions, e.g.,
determining a version number in order to select certain attack
vectors for a given service like a network vulnerability test that
checks a service for the presence of specific security problems.
Penetration testing aims to check if a system can be
effectively attacked. Existing penetration test software relies
on knowing the software and version number of the victim in
order to perform the tests efficiently. Hence it may follow
up after employing RFP. In fact, implementing RFP as a
module is an interesting task for the future. A well known
framework in this context is Metasploit [10]. However, by
default it is relying on software version APIs to detect software
version in the first place. For example, this holds for testing
VMware Horizon [33] or PostgreSQL [16] via Metasploit.
Armitage [34] is a graphical cyber attack management tool
for Metasploit which visualizes targets, exploits, and provides
advanced capabilities of the framework. It also uses the target
software’s API to determine the software version. The Pen-
Testers Framework [35] is a tool to manage penetration testing
tools, but does not employ own fingerprinting techniques.
Vulnerability scanners search for software and network
vulnerabilities, such as known CVEs [36], unsecure config-
urations, or missing updates. Usually, they produce a list
of technical security flaws and can be integrated into SIEM
(security information and event management) software. The
Burp suite [11] is a prominent tool for security testing of
web applications. While it has the capabilities of testing public
functions in general, it natively relies on the target software’s
version API when determining its version. Again, RFP could
be implemented as an extension in the future to solve this
problem. The Burp extension Software Version Reporter [37]
scans passively for applications revealing software version
numbers. The software version is determined by the version
claim made by the target’s service provider. Nessus [9] is
a network and vulnerability scanner for operating systems
that acts mainly as a port scanner, but also scans default
passwords or configurations. That is, specific server software
must run on the target server which clients can connect to in
order to perform scans. However, Version Claim and Version
API of the target are used to determine software version
numbers.Greenbone/OpenVAS [38] is a fork of Nessus and
is developed on its own over the last decade. It consists of
vulnerability management and vulnerability scanners, focusing
on network scanner, operating system, and configurations.
Software versions are determined by employing Version API.
Another tool in this category is nmap [39]. It scans ports,
detects active firewalls, consists of a Remote-Procedure-Call
scanner, but does not scan web- or cloud-services, and relies
on Version Claim or Version API provided by the target entity.
However, nmap sends specific crafted TCP packets to provoke
error messages which in turn allows for OS and network
version detection, if not handled correctly by the target server
and software. w3af [40] is a scanner for vulnerabilities using
a modular structure with the goal to identify, audit, and
exploit vulnerabilities. While it performs attacks like cross-
site scripting and SQL injection, the software version is not
determined but given by the user. Both tools Web Application
Scanning [41] and FreeScan [42] by Qualys scan computers,
websites, and apps for vulnerabilities. To determine a version
number of a software, they rely on Version Claim and Version
API. InsightVM [43] is a platform-based vulnerability scanner
and management tool by Rapid7 and employs Version API
to determine version numbers. Nexpose [44] is a similar
tool but for on-premise use. OWASP Nettacker [45] is a
network information gathering vulnerability scanner and relies
on Version API for fingerprinting.
The goal of version scanners is to determine the version
of multiple softwares employed at once in a web- or cloud-
service, for example webserver and CMS. However, to the
best of our knowledge, all of them rely on Version Claim
and File Structure/Content. Popular version scanners are wap-
palyzer [46] (identifies technologies on websites including
their version numbers), WhatRuns [19] (also identifies tech-
nologies and their version numbers on websites), WhatWeb
[47] (a “next generation web scanner” to determine employed
libraries, software, and versions), and Guess [48] (detects
CMS, frameworks, webserver, libraries, and versions). Blind
Elephant [49] by Qualys uses File Hash Digest to fingerprint
web applications. Similar tools are WAFP [50] and Static
File Fingerprinting tool [51] by Sucuri, both also comparing
checksums of static files.
CMS scanners are specialized on detecting versions, vulner-
abilities, and plugins of content management systems (CMS).
The tool What CMS? [52] detects about 300 different con-
tent management systems, however, the CMS version relies
on Version Claim and file structure (File Structure/Content).
Similarly, wpscan [53] is a security scanner for WordPress,
but identifies the version number based on Version Claim and
File Structure/Content. The following four tools rely only on
static file content (File Structure/Content) on the service host:
Plecost [54] (WordPress fingerprinting tool), WPSeku [55]
(WordPress security scanner), JoomScan [56] (OWASP Joomla
vulnerability scanner project), and CMSScanner [57] (general
CMS scanner framework). Two further tools combine static
files (File Structure/Content) and Version Claim: CMSmap
[58] (open source python CMS scanner) and CMS-Garden
CMSscanner [59] (assumes you to have full access over
the target machine). droopescan [60] identifies issues with
several content management systems, such as Drupal [61] and
Silverstripe [62]. They determine the target’s software version
by comparing md5-fingerprints of static files.
A surplus amount of penetration tools leverages various
logical, security, or implementation faults to gain information
about a system. From this realm of penetration testing tools
stems sqlmap [17]. Its main task consists of detecting and
exploiting SQL flaws. It also comes with a fingerprint function
for databases and the servers they are running on. While the
fingerprinting of the server is quite basic and relies on Version
Claim and File Structure/Content, database versions can be
determined using Version Specific Features or Static Function
Output. This, of course, only works if the web application
has an SQL injection flaw or the tool has direct access to the
database.
There are further tools on the market which have very few
information about them, however, we want to list them for
completeness. The vulnerability scanner by Crashtest Security
[63] has no public available information about their scanner,
similar holds for the web application security test tools Rapid7
or AppSpider [64]. Retina CS [65] is a vulnerability scanner
and management tool by BeyondTrust. In comparison to RFP,
none of the tools presented in this section provide a theoretical
framework or security analysis.
Academic publications regarding software fingerprinting are
quite rare. In [66], the authors detect running crypto libraries in
the cloud by exploiting leakages on the hardware level.Another
approach to this field is software attestation, e.g., see [67] for
an overview. Examples are [68] for embedded devices, [69] for
voting machines, and [70] for sensor networks. The core idea
is to run a challenge-response protocol over the code of the
software and to detect cheating systems by measuring the time
effort for a responses. This limits this approach to devices with
restricted capabilities. In particular, none of them is designed
for web- or cloud applications.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Until now, as the comparison and analysis of employed
fingerprinting techniques has shown (see Sections II-D and
Appendix D1), existing software trusts the provider or its
service to output correct software version values, which may
not be the actual version of the running software. Therefore,
it may occur that insecure software is believed to be secure.
We have presented Reverse Fingerprinting which solves the
RSI problem, i.e., determining which version of a software is
running remotely, e.g., at a cloud service provider.
To achieve this, a database is employed which contains
challenges and expected replies of the target software, where
each challenge depends on inherent, probabilistic parametric
functionalities of the version that is tested. Also, a strategy
is utilized to efficiently choose the correct order of tests
out of the database based on previous tests, producing a
distinguishing sequence of challenge-response pairs based on
intrinsic functions. Furthermore, we introduce and leverage a
theoretical framework based on finite state machines to built
RFP and yield its capabilities. Formalization of the framework
as well as testing software and version hierarchies are also a
key part of RFP. This includes new fingerprinting techniques
and an according security analysis of RFP. Furthermore, RFP
can be extended to work on hardware such as storage, but also
to add an auditor to take away most of the burden of a regular
user resulting in outsourced RFP, i.e., ORFP.
The RFP scheme does not rely on the support of the service
provider. Since only the service or software itself is being
tested, this enables direct verifiability of the running software.
Plus, RFP can be applied independent of the software type,
since intrinsic functions of the software are being leveraged
and tested. For example, it does not matter if RFP tests fo-
rums, content management systems, programming languages,
databases, or PaaS and SaaS in general. To execute RFP, two
steps are required: (i) identification of characteristic function-
alities of certain software versions and (ii) communicating
with a software followed by an evaluation. While (i) needs
to be done manually, (ii) is performed automatically with a
few queries to the target service. This allows to efficiently test
multiple systems at once in a very short amount of time.
While the properties of RFP make it notably useful for the
user, the CSP and auditor also gain benefits. Auditors can
automate and schedule security analyses, additionally, they
may share or sell their developed databases and strategies.
Since RFP is resistant against software manipulation of the
CSP, the trust of customers will increase if an RFP test has
been performed successfully, e.g., by an auditor. This leads to
an increased security overall, since a malicious CSP risks to
be debunked to not have updated its software. For the CSP,
this may result in an increasing number of customers.
The quality of an RFP scheme depends on the employed
database and the interfaces used therein. Obviously, a software
version can not be verified if the customer does not have
access or a sufficiently populated database. For the future, RFP
implementations for further software families are planned, e.g.,
Internet forums. Finally, it would be convenient to combine
RFP with software detection, i.e., detecting the software fam-
ily.
In summary, RFP reliably determines the actual software
version Strg running at a (cloud) service provider by employ-
ing a challenge-response protocol which requires the audited
software Schl = Produce(Ssrc) to perform randomized tasks
based on intrinsic functionalities. Since it is not economical
for the CSP to implement simulation-hard functions of Strg
into Schl in order to pretend having installed Strg, RFP
yields based on a database of challenges, expected responses,
time-constraints, and randomness parametrization the software
version Strg when auditing Schl. This finally allows the verifier
to validate if Ssrc ≡ Strg, i.e., if the service provider is honest.
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APPENDIX
This is a thorough description of all employed fingerprinting
techniques used by state of the art implementations of an RSI
scheme ΠRSI, see Section II-D.
A. Class 1: Version Label-Depending Techniques
1) Version Claim: The most simple and intuitive finger-
printing technique is to send a challenge with the task to
reply with the current software version inside the running
environment. This information together with environmental
data is sent as a response and evaluated, e.g., by extracting
the version number using regular expressions. Usually, this
method is available for any kind of interface I , e.g., may even
be public information. For example, version number in the
footer of a website or as part of a banner5.
One type of Version Claim is known as the information
disclosure attack. In this attack, the remote software contains
a usually publicly accessible resource that leaks internal in-
formation. For web services, many PHP installation tutorials
instruct the administrator to create a PHP file that calls
the function phpinfo() for debugging purposes. Various
installed applications include such a file by default which can
be accessed easily by a remote attacker, extracting a large
amount of information about the software and server, e.g., PHP
and operating system version, server IP address, configuration
data, and so on. Keep in mind that a malicious service provider
can put arbitrary information in such a file, placing a red
herring for attackers and fingerprinting tools at the same time.
See Remark 1 for a general description of an attack strategy
for the software provider.
2) Version API: The verifier will send a challenge to
the API (application programming interface) which in turn
directly yields the version number, hence no further processing
is necessary. For example, in PHP this can be realized by
calling phpinfo() or in most SQL databases via SELECT
VERSION(). It is very similar to Version Claim with the
only difference that the employed challenge interface needs to
have API access. The reason why we include and differentiate
this technique from Version Claim is that in practice, either
Version Claim or a combination of both is used, increasing
the capabilities of implementations.
3) Version Specific Features: The idea of this fingerprinting
technique is to challenge Schl to reply with a function that is
specific for a single software version only, i.e., that literally
depends on the software version. Such a task consists of two
steps: first, load the software version from storage, second, if
the software version equals the specific version given in the
challenge, perform a simple equation check of two randomly
chosen equal numbers. As a result, this will only be true,
5Here, a banner means an ASCII rendering of text or an image with
additional information like the version number and, e.g., the software authors.
if the stored version number is the same as the version
number contained in the challenge. One example are MySQL
queries which use comment execution [71], i.e., a comments
is interpreted and executed as a command only if the version
requirement is fulfilled. However, note that this technique can
be reduced to Version Claim due to reading the version label
from storage.
4) Sub-Software: This fingerprinting technique identifies
the software version of a software S by identifying the soft-
ware versions of some “sub-softwares” S˜ := S1, . . . , Sn that
can be part of S, such as plug-ins. In practice, implementations
perform this test by using the techniques Version Claim,
File Structure/Content (see below), or simply check for file
existence for each S ∈ S˜. Note that this technique requires a
sufficient populated list S˜ to deduce vS . For example, a content
management system can load multiple plugins to enhance
its functionality. Then, each of them is placed in a certain
subfolder which gets scanned by this fingerprinting technique
for plugin versions or existence.
Note that this technique relies only on other techniques
which are part of fingerprinting technique classes that are not
secure, see Appendix D1. Even assuming these techniques
would be secure, S˜ must be sufficiently large in order to con-
clude the version number of S, we currently see no software
employing enough plugins in order to reliably determine its
version. Since this fingerprinting technique can be reduced to
Version Claim or File Structure/Content, it belongs to both
fingerprinting technique classes one and two.
5) Error Code: Similar to Version Claim and Version API,
V sends a query to Sin order to retrieve a string containing the
version number. However, in this case, the goal is to provoke
an error in the software to output an error message containing
the version number. For example, using a string as input for
a function that is only defined for integer input. One of the
tools relying on this technique is nmap [39]. incorporates
this technique but can be defeated by appropriate tools [72]–
[74]. Since this fingerprinting technique can be reduced to
Version Claim or File Structure/Content, it belongs to both
fingerprinting technique classes one and two.
If an error occurs in an underlying software S that acts as
a platform for Schl, for example, a database to run a forum,
information about S can be retrieved through Schl. We are not
aware that any software uses this technique but list it here for
completeness, please see Remark 2 for more details.
B. Class 2: Output Function-Depending Techniques
1) File Structure/Content: In this technique, a challenge of
the verifier requests Schl to respond with a certain file. The
reply, i.e., a static file, is then parsed by the verifier, e.g.,
by using regular expressions or to check the structure of the
file, e.g., order of configuration commands. The outcome is
compared to certain previously computed values which belong
to a software version each. For example, a verifier will search
for certain text strings, HTML tag nesting, referenced URLs,
simple key words, or the style of a readme file. As for Version
Claim, a malicious provider can change the content of the
static files, i.e., strings. See Remark 1 for a general description
of an attack strategy for the provider and Remark 3 for a note
on file randomization.
2) File Hash Digest: This technique is sometimes referred
to as “aggressive verification” by various implementations,
since it checks every bit of a requested file. A hash algorithm
is applied to the file retrieved by a response and afterwards
this value is compared to a pre-computed hash value stored at
the verifier. For example, the verifier may request a readme
file and a configuration file. On retrieval, he computes the
hash value for each file and compares the output with his pre-
computed values. Note that this technique can be reduced to
File Structure/Content.
C. Class 3: Transition Function-Depending Techniques
1) Static Function Output: The idea is to send challenges,
where the according response depends on certain version-
dependent functions to verify if these functions exist properly.
Parameters p for a function f can be fixed or randomized. In
essence, the challenges consists of performing the comparison
f(p) = f(p). For example, sending a query to execute (
content(var)=content(var)) with fixed values, will require the
existence of the function content and the variable var.
However, this technique will always return a static binary
value, i.e. true or false.
D. Class 4: Security Flaw-Depending Techniques
1) Security Exploit: This technique exploits a security
vulnerability of the audited software. If no update has been
applied, the exploit will be successful. For example, an au-
thentication check may not be performed correctly, allowing
access to otherwise protected information.
While vulnerability scanners test for security vulnerabilities,
to the best of our knowledge they do not use the outcome
to determine the version number. Usually, first the version
number is determined, e.g., by Version API, then one or more
attacks are performed. Note that this may lead to an abrupt
halt of the software, which allows for no further tests or audits.
Remark 1 (Regular Expression and Hash Digest Security):
If ΠRSI is open source (or reversible) and it uses regular
expressions and/or a hash function as a fingerprinting tech-
nique, then this provides a blueprint to P how to pretend
any version number. The P only needs to investigate the
regular expressions or possibly requested files and copy the
required file from the software distributor’s original repository
(or similar source). Then, he redirects any internal request to
that file to a modified version of the file, while any external file
access gets delivered the (original) file and hash value of the
claimed version. Also observe that if a honest P changes a file
in a way that it contains negligible changes (e.g., white spaces)
or indeed certain file changes like specific configurations or
style changes, the software version did not change but the
ΠRSI employing the hash digest technique would yield a
wrong result. If P knows that a regular expression is used
to find a certain value in a given file, he can simply insert a
forged value for the certain expression such that the regular
expression discovers the values the P wants to return. If an
ΠRSI is not open source, P might learn over time which files
are accessed, since usually only a very limited set (at most
three) of specific files is part of ΠRSI.
In summary, this attack shows that neither regular ex-
pressions nor hash digests are suited for software version
fingerprinting. Using hash functions may even yield false
negatives.
Remark 2 (Using Underlying Structures to Determine a
Software Version): Independent of software dependencies, only
the software Schl is queried during RFP. In RFP, we do not
employ underlying or lower level software or structures (LL)
as side-channel information for higher level software (HL).
Furthermore, a customer usually has no access to LL, but in
the case he does, it is trivial to determine the version numbers
of HL since he has full control thereof.
For the other way around, using HL to retrieve information
about LL, the verifier could provoke errors in HL to produce
an error message from LL, e.g., PHP running under Wordpress
and an error in PHP due to a false used function of Wordpress.
However, this does not allow to precisely determine a version
number of LL. The reason is that the error message is static,
can be changed to an arbitrary string, and will not depend
on different functionalities of LL. If HL is just a wrapper of
LL, this comes down to testing LL directly by using another
interface, for example, security flaws in HL allow accessing
LL through HL. Recall that RFP employs interfaces which
can be used to address different access levels.
Remark 3 (On Randomization for File Structure and File
Content): To the best of our knowledge, in all current auditing
softwares which rely on a technique based on static files such
as File Structure/Content and File Hash Digest, usually only
a very limited set (in fact, at most three) of specific files is
requested in the challenge. Let us assume that any file of Schl
can be chosen by the verifier and Schl provides enough files
such that it is unfeasible for provider P to create a file-switch
for each file, i.e., decide which version to deliver depending
on the verifier’s challenge. Then, randomization will not be
economical, i.e., more expensive than running the agreed on
software Strg, and hence out of interest for P.
In this section we will provide a security analysis of the
classes of fingerprinting techniques given in Section II-D.
E. Class 1: Version Label-Depending Techniques
During setup, Strg ∈ S is chosen and P sets Schl =
Produce(Ssrc), where both softwares are identical except for
vSchl 6= vSsrc and ΓSchl = ~γSsrc ∪vSchl . In the testing phase, V
sends σ that requests Schl to output the value of the software
version. However, Schl returns γ ← vSchl . Finally, V outputs
C = γ = vSchl 6= vSsrc , which contradicts ΠRFP-soundness.
Also note that due to σ 6∈ DSH(Strg), it is immediately clear
that the verifier can be fooled.
F. Class 2: Output Function-Depending Techniques
During setup, Strg ∈ S is chosen and P sets Schl =
Produce(Ssrc), where both softwares are identical except for
ΓSchl = Γ˜ and ωSchl = ω˜, such that ω˜ simulates a software
with software version v˜ ∈ Γ˜ by yielding certain elements
of Γ˜. Note that the value of vSchl does not matter, since the
responses of Schl will not depend on it. In the testing phase,
V sends σ that requests Schl to output a (very small) set
Γ′Ssrc ( ΓSsrc . However, Schl returns γ ← Γ′Schl . Finally, V
outputs C = v˜ 6= vSsrc derived from (σ, γ), which contradicts
ΠRFP-soundness. Also note that due to σ 6∈ DSH(Strg), it is
immediately clear that the verifier can be fooled.
G. Class 3: Transition Function-Depending Techniques
Let Γδ = {true,false}. During setup, V selects Strg ∈
S such that it has the highest version for all softwares in S,
i.e., vStrg > vS ∀ S ∈ S. The P sets Schl = Produce(Ssrc),
where both softwares are identical except for ΓSchl = Γ˜ and
δSchl = δ˜, where δ˜ simulates v˜ ∈ Γ˜. Furthermore, he sets
vSchl 6= vSsrc with {vSchl ∪ Γδ} ∈ Γ˜. The testing phase is as
follows:
1) V selects a function
f ∈ FStrg \
⋃
S∈S
vS<vStrg
FS
and sends σ to Schl, requesting the output of f which is
defined for this fingerprinting technique as an element
of Γδ .
2) Schl returns γ ∈ Γδ .
3) If γ = true, V sets Strg to be the software with the
next lower version in S and proceeds with step 2).
If γ = false, V stops.
Since Schl computed each γ according to v˜, V outputs C =
v˜ 6= vSsrc derived from all tuples (σ, γ), which contradicts
ΠRFP-soundness.
Observe that Schl does not need to evaluate f , he may
output true and false according to any version v˜ he wants
to simulate. This especially holds if f is a simulation-hard
function of Ssrc, i.e., f 6∈ FSchl .
Also note that due to σ 6∈ DSH(Strg) for all σ chosen in
step 1), it is immediately clear that the verifier can be fooled.
We refer the reader to Remark 4 where we discuss the property
RFP-secure of the class 3 fingerprinting technique Static
Function Output, also in respect to existing implementations.
Remark 4 (RFP Secure Static Function Output): We de-
scribe and analyze the fingerprinting technique Static Function
Output in Appendix C1 and Appendix D1, respectively. To be
secure according to RFP, see Definition 8, a fingerprinting
technique needs also to be time-constrained, probabilistic,
and employ intrinsic functions. Static Function Output might
indeed access intrinsic functions and a time-constrained can
be added easily. However, the response of Schl is always
taken from the decision set {true,false}. The probabilis-
tic protocol ΠRFP requires the response to depend on the
randomness of the challenge. This is not given in a correct
manner for this fingerprinting technique, since no matter how
good the randomness source of the verifier is, the malicious
prover has always a 50% chance of correct guessing. Note that
the only existing implementation employing this fingerprinting
technique [17], does not randomize the challenge. Hence,
Static Function Output is not RFP-secure.
H. Class 4: Security Flaw-Depending Techniques
This fingerprinting technique was actually never used to
determine a version number, however, it might yield an error
state (⊥), e.g., due to a deadlock or software crash. In general,
Schl might unintentionally halt and V can not run ΠRFP until
the end. Hence, ΠRFP-correctness is not given.
I. Overall Result
The presented classes of fingerprinting techniques violate
ΠRFP-correctness or ΠRFP-soundness and, hence, can be
successfully fooled by a malicious prover P.
The bash script presented in Listing 3 manipulates the
software version of PHP by changing the configuration values
before compiling. The idea is that the strings defining the
software version are configuration parameters of the installing
process, and hence, may be changed nearly arbitrarily. In
Listing 3, these variables are set in Lines 3–7. Note that there
is also a “real” version variable which, in RFP terminology,
defines Ssrc while the fake ones change the software version
string for Schl. In other words, this script essentially performs
Produce with Schl = Produce(Ssrc). See Section III-C for
more information about Produce. Then, PHP 7.1.1 runs as
PHP 20.9.85-car on the host system, e.g., Ubuntu 16.04.3 and
Apache 2.
Remark 5 (Definition of δ): According to equation (1), test-
ing for a function f as part of ΠRFP will yield δ = true for
all S with vSchl ≥ vS . Let us get an overview of the different
equality tests that can be employed here, i.e., <, ≤, =, ≥,
and >. For = we have δ ← true iff vSchl = vS . However,
equality is the overall goal of RFP and can not be achieved
by a single ΠRFP instance as explained in Section IV-D.
Hence, this comparison does not make sense here. For ≥ we
have δ ← true iff vSchl ≥ vS , naturally represents the fact
described in equation (1). Testing for < yields if f has not yet
been introduced to S, and complements the test for ≥ (and is
reflected by δ ← false in ΠRFP). Using only < would make
testing for newest versions impossible. Similar, a test for ≤
and >would also be suitable for ΠRFP, representing checking
for removed functions. In practice, however, much more often
functions will be added than removed, resulting in testing for
(≥, >) being the best candidate.
In Listing 4 we give an example for metadata configuration
of a RFP database for the software family PHP.
Listing 4. Example metadata of a RFP database for PHP.
1 ” c r e a t i o n T i m e s t a m p ” : ”2018−10−17T03 : 3 2 : 2 9 + 0 2 : 0 0 ” ,
2 ” l a s t U p d a t e T i m e s t a m p ” : ”2018−11−14T04 : 1 7 : 1 8 + 0 1 : 0 0 ” ,
3 ” d e f a u l t v a l u e s ” : {
4 ” v e r s i o n . t e s t . c h a l l e n g e . s e t s t a r t t a g ” : ” t r u e ” ,
5 ” v e r s i o n . t e s t . c h a l l e n g e . s e t e n d t a g ” : ” f a l s e ” ,
6 ” v e r s i o n . t e s t . e x p e c t . s e t s t a r t t a g ” : ” f a l s e ” ,
7 ” v e r s i o n . t e s t . e x p e c t . s e t e n d t a g ” : ” f a l s e ” ,
8 ” v e r s i o n . t e s t . e x p e c t . t y p e ” : ” s t r i n g ” ,
9 ” v e r s i o n . t e s t . l a b e l ” : ” 0 ” ,
10 ” v e r s i o n . t e s t . v a r i a b l e s . t y p e ” : ” r and ” ,
11 ” v e r s i o n . t e s t . v a r i a b l e s . f o r m a t ” : ” v a l u e ” ,
12 ” v e r s i o n . t e s t . w a i t t i m e . amount ” : 200 ,
13 ” v e r s i o n . t e s t . w a i t t i m e . t y p e ” : ” m i l l i s e c o n d s ”
14 } ,
15 ” s e t t i n g s ” : {
16 ” i n t e r f a c e . c h a l l e n g e s ” : ” f t p ” ,
17 ” i n t e r f a c e . r e s p o n s e s ” : ” h t t p ” ,
18 ” s t r a t e g i e s ” : [
19 ” B i n a r y S e a r c h ” ,
20 ” C a s c a d i n g B i n a r y S e a r c h ” ,
21 ”HighToLow” ,
22 ”LowToHigh” ,
23 ” MajorHighes tS tepUp ”
24 ]
25 } ,
26 ” s e r v i c e ” : {
27 ”name” : ” php ” ,
28 ” v e r s i o n s ” : { . . . }
29 }
In Table III we give an overview of related work in
comparison of fingerprinting techniques, their classes, and
relevant related techniques which possibly could be used as
fingerprinting techniques, such as exploiting security flaws.
Listing 3. Software version manipulation script in bash for PHP 7.1.1 running on Ubuntu 16.04.3 and Apache 2.
1
2 echo ” F e t c h and i n s t a l l PHP”
3
4 PHP VERSION REAL=” 7 . 1 . 1 ”
5 PHP VERSION FAKE MAJOR=” 20 ”
6 PHP VERSION FAKE MINOR=” 9 ”
7 PHP VERSION FAKE RELEASE=” 85 ”
8 PHP VERSION FAKE EXTRA=”−c a r ”
9
10 cd / u s r / s r c
11 i f [ [ ‘ wget −S −−s p i d e r ” h t t p : / / de2 . php . n e t / g e t / php−$PHP VERSION REAL . t a r . gz / from /
t h i s / m i r r o r ” 2>&1 | g rep ’HTTP / 1 . 1 200 OK’ ‘ ] ] ; then
12 sudo wget −O ” php−$PHP VERSION REAL . t a r . gz ” ” h t t p : / / de2 . php . n e t / g e t / php−
$PHP VERSION REAL . t a r . gz / from / t h i s / m i r r o r ”
13 e l s e
14 PHP VERSION REAL MAJOR=${PHP VERSION REAL%%.∗}
15 sudo wget −O ” php−$PHP VERSION REAL . t a r . gz ” ” h t t p : / / museum . php . n e t /
php$PHP VERSION REAL MAJOR / php−$PHP VERSION REAL . t a r . gz ”
16 f i
17 sudo t a r −z x f ” php−$PHP VERSION REAL . t a r . gz ”
18 sudo rm − r f ” / u s r / s r c / php−$PHP VERSION REAL . t a r . gz ”
19 sudo mv ” php−$PHP VERSION REAL” ” . / php−$PHP VERSION FAKE”
20 cd ” php−$PHP VERSION FAKE”
21 CONFIGFILE=$ ( l s c o n f i g u r e . ∗ ) # f i l e t y p e s t r i n g i s n o t c o n s t a n t
22 sudo sed − i ” / PHP MAJOR VERSION=/ c\PHP MAJOR VERSION=$PHP VERSION FAKE MAJOR”
$CONFIGFILE
23 sudo sed − i ” / PHP MINOR VERSION=/ c\PHP MINOR VERSION=$PHP VERSION FAKE MINOR”
$CONFIGFILE
24 sudo sed − i ” / PHP RELEASE VERSION=/ c\PHP RELEASE VERSION=$PHP VERSION FAKE RELEASE”
$CONFIGFILE
25 sudo sed − i ” / PHP EXTRA VERSION=/ c\PHP EXTRA VERSION=$PHP VERSION FAKE EXTRA”
$CONFIGFILE
26 sudo . / b u i l d c o n f −−f o r c e
27 sudo . / c o n f i g u r e ”−−p r e f i x =$DIR PHP” ”−−with−apxs2 =$DIR HTTPD / b i n / apxs ” ”−−with−
c o n f i g−f i l e−p a t h =$DIR PHP” −−with−mysql
28 sudo make
29 sudo make i n s t a l l
30 sudo l i b t o o l −−f i n i s h . / l i b s
Implementation FT Classes Fingerprinting Techniques Employed Relevant Related Techniques
Penetration Frameworks
Metasploit [10] 1 Version Claim, Version API Security Exploit
Armitage [34] 1 Version Claim, Version API Security Exploit
PenTesters Framework [35] – – –
Vulnerability Scanners
Burp Suite [11] 1 Version Claim, Version API Security Exploit
Nessus [9] 1 Version Claim, Version API Security Exploit
Greenbone/OpenVAS [38] 1 Version Claim Security Exploit
droopescan [60] 1, 2 File Hash Digest, Sub-Software Security Exploit
nmap [39] 1 Version Claim, Version API, Error Code (TCP) –
Software Version Reporter [37] 1 Version Claim –
w3af [40] – – Security Exploit
Web Application Scanning [41] 1 Version Claim, Version API –
FreeScan [42] 1 Version Claim, Version API –
Nexpose [44] 1 Version API –
InsightVM [43] 1 Version API –
OWASP Nettacker [45] 1 Version API –
Online Version Scanners
wappalyzer [46] 1 Version Claim –
WhatRuns [19] 1 Version Claim –
WhatWeb [47] 1, 2 Version Claim, File Hash Digest –
Guess [48] 1, 2 Version Claim, File Structure/Content, Sub-Software –
BlindElephant [49] 2 File Hash Digest –
WAFP [50] 2 File Hash Digest –
Static File Fingerprinting [51] 2 File Hash Digest –
CMS Scanners
What CMS? [52] 1 Version Claim –
WPScan [53] 1, 2 Version Claim, File Structure/Content –
Plecost [54] 2 File Structure/Content –
WPSeku [55] 2 File Structure/Content –
JoomScan [56] 2 File Structure/Content –
CMSScanner [57] 2 File Structure/Content –
CMSmap [58] 1, 2 Version Claim, File Structure/Content –
CMS-Garden CMSscanner [59] 1, 2 Version Claim, File Structure/Content –
Other Tools
sqlmap [17] 1, 3 Version Claim, Error Code, Version Specific Features, Static
Function Output
–
This Work
Reverse Fingerprinting 5 Error Handling, Dynamic Request Response, Non-Destructive
Security Exploit
–
TABLE III
DIFFERENT TOOLS AND THEIR EMPLOYED FINGERPRINTING TECHNIQUES (FT). RELEVANT RELATED TECHNIQUES REPRESENT FT THAT A TOOL DOES
SUPPORT, BUT ARE NOT USED FOR FINGERPRINTING. FT CLASS FIVE IS, IN CONTRAST TO FT CLASSES ONE TO FOUR, RFP-SECURE.
